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This thesis assesses the economy-wide impacts of tax amnesty policy in 
Indonesia during 2016-2017 on selected economic and social indicators. This paper 
points out that the impacts of asset repatriation and extra tax revenue collected from tax 
amnesty can be only measured and analyzed comprehensively if those two amnesty 
outcomes are being treated as exogenous variables in a price-endogenous model such 
as FCGE (financial computable general equilibrium). Seven tax amnesty policy 
scenarios consist of factual and counterfactuals are simulated with the model to assess 
the effects of those two shocks on 9 economic indicators and 3 social indicators. 
 The simulations reveal that, in general, tax amnesty generates a slight 
expansionary effect on the economy at the cost of worsening income inequality. The 
simulations also show that even though ‘targeted’ and ‘non-targeted’ tax amnesties lead 
the economy to grow, income inequality between the poor and the rich is widened. 
Financial income effects and forgiveness effect are held responsible for the worsening 
income inequality between the poor and the rich in Indonesia. Out of seven simulations, 
one shows that tax amnesty that is designed to specifically target the rich and 
corporations but with no salient information on where the repatriated assets have been 
allocated in the financial market—tend to have contractionary effect on the economy.    
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
 Three months after the 2016 Indonesian tax amnesty program ended in March 
2017, President Joko Widodo administration, also known as Jokowi, claimed that the 
current amnesty program is the largest and the most successful tax amnesty in the history 
(Figure1). Long before the Indonesian Parliament passed the legal basis for this program 
in July 2016 (Law No.11/2016), television and news media were dominated by debates 
over the urgency of tax amnesty and its impacts on the Indonesian economic 
development and the widening income inequality. 
  
Figure 1 - Cross-countries Comparison of Asset Declared and Penalties Collected during Tax Amnesty 
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 Since its Independence Day in August 1945, Indonesia had launched tax amnesty 
program three times. The first and the second tax amnesties took place in 1964 and 
1984, but unfortunately, both were failed. Under President Soekarno administration, the 
first Indonesian tax amnesty program in 1965 failed to reach its tax revenue target of 25 
billion Indonesian Rupiah (see Kompas Daily in Figure 2 below). The program was 
extended until November 10, 1965, but no progress has been made as the domestic 
political unrest triggered by the September 30th Movement (Gestapu) of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) took place.  
 
Figure 2 - Newspaper Page on Tax Amnesty in the Era of President Soekarno in 1965 
 The second tax amnesty policy took place in 1984 during the era of President 
Soeharto administration. At that time, Indonesia’s economy was in the stage of post-oil 
bonanza and in the middle of economic crisis as shocked by the 1982-1983’s worldwide 
economic recession and by the world’s oil prices decline during 1983 until 1986. Under 
those external pressures, President Soeharto adjusted the large deficit in the government 
budget by undertaking radical tax reforms and tax amnesty policy to collect alternative 
income source to replace oil export revenue loss. The 1984 tax amnesty was part of the 
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Indonesian government’s efforts to boost the revenue side of the central budget by 
targeting underground economy. Although raison d'être for this tax amnesty policy is 
different from that of 1964, the cause of the policy failure is substantially the same i.e. 
low-level participation of taxpayers.  
 Thirty-two years later, in July 2016, President Jokowi administration, launched 
another tax amnesty policy. This time, the policy was more ambitious than its 
predecessors. Despite haunted by past failure experiences, the target was set high and 
the legal basis was escalated to the parliament level. Unlike the 1964’s and 1984’s tax 
amnesty, the legal basis of this third amnesty policy was not merely a Presidential 
executive order, but a law passed by the Indonesian Parliament with the expectation that 
the classic problem of low-levels taxpayer participation could be overcome.  
 However, to date, neither the Ministry of Finance (MoF) nor the Directorate 
General of Tax (DGT) has published an official evaluation report on the impact of the 
2016’s tax amnesty policy on the improvement of tax base and taxpayer compliance—
let alone the macroeconomic impact and the socio-economic impact of the policy (i.e. 
income distribution among different household strata in the economy). The only report 
published by the Indonesian government is descriptive statistical information containing 
the Indonesian Rupiah value of the penalties paid and the domestic (including foreign) 
asset declared or repatriated by the policy participants.  
 Academic studies that focus on the impact analysis of this amnesty are very limited 
in numbers. Many of them addressed the controversial legal aspect of the policy if not 
merely provided cross-countries descriptive comparison studies. Whereas the rest, 
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emphasize more on the short run government revenue effect and the potential risk of 
taxpayer distrust with respect to the tax administration’s enforcement capacity—which 
in the long run could incentivize tax evasion and avoidance (moral hazard), or even 
generates a new pattern of non-compliance behavior among individual taxpayers.   
 Therefore, it is of great interest to determine the impact of the 2016’s tax amnesty 
policy on the wider aspect of the Indonesia economy, especially on the macroeconomic 
measures such as consumption, investment, trade balance, domestic liquidity, exchange 
rate and inflation, as well as poverty and income distribution among the poor and the 
rich in both rural and urban area in Indonesia. This study is a pilot study attempted to 
evaluate the full impact of Indonesia third tax amnesty policy (using proxies as 
mentioned in Law No.16/2016 on Tax Amnesty) and to analyze the interdependence 
among variables and agents in the Indonesian economy. 
 The result of this study would be potentially quite important and helpful for 
lawmakers and policymakers, particularly those who deal with economy-wide impact 
evaluation of tax policy changes. The model used in this study offers not only a partial 
equilibrium approach, but a more general, comprehensive, and realistic approach to 
estimate fiscal policy impact on the domestic economic efficiency and equity. Although 
commonly empirical study is not the only input to be considered in the policy-making 
process, I hope this study can benefit Indonesia within the next decade or two as a 
reference for future tax amnesty program or even for bigger reform agenda.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. On the Rationale of Tax Amnesties 
 There are extensive literature on the economics and politics of tax amnesties. A 
cross-states econometric analysis by Le Borgne on the determinant of tax amnesty 
policies in the United States over the period of 1977 to 1998 showed that the policies 
are more likely to be introduced as a revenue generating source when states’ 
indebtedness is growing (Le Borgne, 2005). Governments around the world also 
typically perceive tax amnesty as a reliable strategy to generate extra tax revenue, 
particularly during an economic downturn or budget pressure. Although there have been 
many concerns about the long-term effect of tax amnesty policy, many governments 
still consider it as an efficient revenue raiser, at the same time, effective enforcement 
cost reducer, and in some cases serves as a political instrument that helps transition to 
stricter tax regime fairer (Leonard & Zeckhauser, 1987).  
 From taxpayer’s perspective, tax amnesty is a limited-time chance to pay unpaid 
taxes prior to the program without being subject to penalties, audit, investigation, or 
prosecution for any tax evasion crime (Beck II, 1991). Hence, for taxpayers, amnesty 
provides financial and legal forgiveness. Using Franzoni’s language taken from his 
paper titled Punishment and Grace: on the Economics of Permanent Amnesties, tax 
amnesty induces taxpayers with high willingness to pay to self-select themselves as a 
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program participant and to escape from tax agency’s standard enforcement or 
prosecution procedure (Franzoni, 1996).  
 In short run, one can subsequently conclude that the direct observable impact of 
tax amnesty policy includes increasing gross tax revenue and reducing the cost of 
administration—especially the enforcement cost. While the short-term and medium-
term net revenue gains that are derived from tax amnesty policies vary across countries, 
many studies suggest that successful tax amnesty is rare. The most successful tax 
amnesties have relied on institutional factor such as improvement of tax agency’s 
enforcement capacity (Le Borgne & Baer, 2008).  
 Empirical evidence to clarify that argument is broadly available. In 2008, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted a cross-country study on tax amnesties 
and found that tax amnesty programs have produced mixed results regarding gross tax 
revenue collection. Countries that have become subject of the analysis include the 
United States, Argentina, Ireland, Italy, India, Turkey, and the Philippines.   
 In the U.S., from 1980 to 2004, seventy-eight tax amnesties were offered and 
mainly designed for collecting “extra” revenue in the middle of fiscal distress. Although 
considered as successful programs in short-run (1 fiscal year) under gross revenue 
measure, it turns out that 92% of these successes contains revenues collected from 
account receivable.1 Hence, by excluding account receivable in the calculation, yet 
taking into account administrative costs (e.g., overtime pay for tax agency employees, 
                                                 
1 Account receivable from tax administration's point of view refers to tax liabilities associated with tax 
evaders or delinquent taxpayers that have already been detected and billed by tax agency but have not 
been successfully collected, yet. 
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advertising and public relation costs, and other costs related to the additional workflows, 
not forget to mention the indirect cost of resource reallocation from routine enforcement 
and services to amnesty management), one can easily find that net revenue gained from 
tax amnesties is likely insignificant. 
 Tax amnesties in Argentina (1995), India (1997), and Ireland (1999) can be 
considered successful in terms of gross revenue collection. From 1950 to 2004, 
Argentina had offered around 20 tax amnesties and collected $3.9 billion of gross 
revenue in the 1995’s general tax amnesty program. India succeeded in collecting gross 
revenue of around $2.5 billion in 1997 and gathered $9.8 billion taxpayers’ asset 
declaration in 2016 (Mundy, 2016). Another successful tax amnesty program was 
Ireland’s third amnesty in 1999, collected more than $1 billion gross revenue only after 
the government gained leverage from the willingness of banking institutions to 
cooperate with tax agency to exchange taxpayer-related information.  
 Other developing countries like Turkey and the Philippines frequently applied tax 
amnesties for 29 times from 1923 to 2016 and 18 times between 1972 and 1987, 
respectively. Both countries’ stand-alone tax amnesties were not successful in 
increasing tax revenue-to-GDP ratio during the period of amnesties and post the 
programs.2 Evidence from Turkey, the Philippines, and Argentina support Stella’s 
conclusion that frequently repeated amnesty programs in a situation where rooms for 
enforcement capacity improvement are too narrow (if not unavailable) tend to reduce 
                                                 
2 Stand-alone tax amnesty practices refer to tax amnesty programs that serve merely as a temporary 
solution of fiscal distress, without followed by fundamental change in tax system legal framework, tax 
policy, or tax administration’s enforcement capacity improvement.  
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government revenue performance thus the tax-to-GDP ratio overtime, taxpayer 
compliance, and tax agency credibility (Stella, 1991). 
 The Scudo Fiscale, Italy tax amnesty program introduced in 2009—is different 
from those whose objective is merely collecting extra tax revenue. It has different 
rationale compared to other countries’ tax amnesty practices. The policy aims to boost 
economic growth by spurring domestic investment through asset repatriation. By doing 
so, it is expected that broader tax base can yield higher tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. 
Although failed in generating significant short-run gross revenue for its treasury—only 
$7.2 billion collected (Dade, 2009), the Italian Scudo Fiscale was very successful in 
repatriating large scale of off-shore capital ($136.8 billion) into the domestic economy 
(Cohen & Clark, 2009). Same story, South Africa in 2003 and Chile in 2015 both 
succeed in repatriating approximately $8.5 billion and $19.5 billion of off-shore asset, 
respectively, while collecting extra tax revenue of around $170 million and $1.5 billion, 
respectively (Ariyanti, 2016). 
2.2. Indonesia Tax Amnesty: Macroeconomic and Institutional Objectives 
 Indonesia tax amnesty policy in 2016 is a special case in terms of its objectives 
and the magnitude of its outcome (not its impact). The policy objectives go beyond 
gross revenue collection and taxpayer compliance. It aimed mainly at macroeconomic 
objectives and regime change. Among three objectives mentioned in Law No.11 of 2016 
on Tax Amnesty, boosting economic growth and economic restructuring through asset 
repatriation is on the top of the list (Republic of Indonesia, 2016). Four proxies to 
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evaluate the impact of tax amnesty outcome are mentioned specifically in the Law. They 
are domestic liquidity, exchange rate, interest rate, and (domestic) investments.3  
 The second objective according to the Law is institutional change (to more 
stringent tax regime). The inclusion of this objective in the Law supports Alm et al’s 
proposition that tax amnesties can also be used for signaling tax regime transition to a 
tougher regime (Alm, McKee, & Beck, 1990). Per Law No.11/2016, the institutional 
change is signaled by two measures: firstly, tax reform or legal framework improvement 
that promote more equitable tax system; and secondly, database advancement. The third 
(last) objective of Indonesia tax amnesty is similar to that of tax amnesty program in 
general, that is to increase tax revenue.  
 Two key aspects of Indonesia’s tax amnesty can be extracted from those three 
objectives. These are macroeconomic aspect and the notion regarding more equitable 
tax system. It is important to bear in mind that the way lawmakers sort these aspects 
into first and second order reflects their priority scale. One question, hence, should be 
asked; that is to what extent Indonesia’s tax amnesty program promote (1) economic 
growth with minimum distortion (i.e., efficiency) for the economy, and (2) equitable 
income distribution and poverty incidence reduction. Previous studies have overlooked 
this pivotal question in their analysis.  
                                                 
3 The Law requires the repatriated assets to be invested domestically at least 3 (three) years in government 
securities, state owned enterprises’ bond, government bond, financial investments in commercial banks, 
corporate bonds, infrastructure investments, real sector investments that are prioritized by government, 
and/or other legitimate investments under the law. It also restricts transfer of the declared assets to foreign 
countries within three years period. 
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 Another issue failed to be addressed by previously published studies on the 
impacts of tax amnesty on economic well-being is the transmission mechanism of 
shocks generated by the policy outcomes, i.e. repatriated asset and the extra tax revenue 
collected by tax agency. Thus far, most of the discussions in the literature on tax 
amnesty only focused on the legal aspect, behavioral aspect (using Prospect Theory), 
and on some technical details of the program’s administration. Therefore, economy-
wide impact analysis is needed to shed light on the macroeconomic and distributional 
effects of tax amnesty policy that are often ignored by many analysts.  
2.3. Economy-wide Models 
 The superiority of economy-wide model over econometric or other models lies in 
its ability in capturing the interdependence and interconnectedness between micro and 
macroeconomic variables in the economy, comprehensively (Min, 2014). The 
mechanism on how macro aggregates influence—and be influenced by—the economic 
agents’ behavior, hence, can be explicitly explained by this model. Among many 
scholars who firstly used the economy-wide approach for the case of Indonesia were 
Thorbecke (1991), Lewis (1991), and Azis (1995). 
 Thorbecke used Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the 
impact of voluntary Stabilization and Structural Adjustment (SSA) policy implemented 
by Indonesian government during the 1980s oil glut (1982-1988) on economic growth 
and income distribution. He found that although the economic growth was slowing 
down, the structural reform succeeded in improving income distribution (Thorbecke, 
1991). Lewis documented CGE model for Indonesian Ministry of Finance in 1991 using 
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aggregate Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of 1985. Lewis’ model was specially 
designed to analyze the impact of taxation and trade policy changes on Indonesia’s fiscal 
performance and economic structure (Lewis, 1991).  
 Compared to Lewis’ model, Thorbecke’s CGE model, however, had more detailed 
(disaggregated) SAM for its input. Moreover, Thorbecke’s disaggregated social 
accounting matrix can be categorized as more advanced SAM for it takes into account 
Indonesia’s flow of funds data. In his paper in 1991, Thorbecke called the combination 
of real sector SAM and flow of funds table as financial SAM (FSAM).  
 Azis, in 1995, developed a CGE model for developing country applied to 
Indonesia with more disaggregated labor factor and households in his 1985’s Indonesian 
SAM (i.e., six categories of labor and households lived in rural area and two categories 
for those who live in urban area). He then used both static and dynamic CGE model 
simulations to analyze the impact of Indonesia’s post-economic reform progress on 
macroeconomic variables and emphasized more on income distribution between rural 
and urban households. Indonesia’s economic reform constitutes three shocks, among 
which are 1980s oil glut, devaluation in 1986, and tax reforms in 1985. Azis’ static 
simulation found that government investment in the agricultural sector was pivotal for 
the improvement of income distribution between rural and urban households. Through 
dynamic simulation, he found that although Indonesia’s gross domestic products (GDP) 
was constantly growing, the progress of economic reform worsened the income 
inequality between income groups in urban and rural area (Azis, 1997). 
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 Two years later, in 1999, Bautista, Robinson, and El-Said echoed Azis’ findings. 
Using 1995’s Indonesian SAM for their economy-wide analysis (i.e., SAM multiplier 
analysis and CGE simulations), they found that significant GDP increase and income 
inequality reduction in Indonesia can be associated with agricultural demand-led (ADL) 
industrialization. On the other hand, spurring manufacturing sector yields in worsening 
income inequality and insignificant increase in GDP. They put some details in equity 
issue through which they recommend the country to increase its farm products export 
to maintain agricultural sector’s terms of trade (Bautista, Robinson, & El-Said, 1999). 
 The application of economy-wide models, especially price-endogenous models 
such as CGE is not limited only to policy change or external shock’s impact analysis. 
The model also applied for assessing the impact of regional integration scenarios on 
single country or even a group of countries. Lewis and Robinson (1996) use multi-
country CGE model to assess the effect of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) free trade area creation on 
Indonesia economy. One of their simulation results suggests that the creation of FTA 
(free trade area) for ASEAN gives little benefit to Indonesia. In contrast, APEC FTA 
creation gives its members, especially Indonesia, significant benefits (Lewis & 
Robinson, 1996). 
 Post-1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), the application of economy-wide model 
became even more relevant. The model helped those who were severely affected by the 
crisis like Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and South Korea to map out the 
crisis mechanism which eventually affected socio-economic indicators like poverty and 
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income inequality. Robilliard and Robinson (2005) updated the 1995 Indonesia social 
accounting matrix with data from the fiscal year 2002 (i.e., value added, export-import, 
and other macro data) to capture structural changes after the crisis. CGE simulation was 
utilized to assess the social impact of liberalization scenarios on poverty reduction and 
income inequality. Among those scenarios are Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and 
full liberalization with increased Value Added Tax (VAT) rate to cover government 
revenue loss from the import duty cut. Both scenarios yielded very insignificant income 
inequality reduction at the national level—i.e., 0.0 and -0.1 percentage change of Gini 
index, respectively—even though headcount ratio (HCR) decreased slightly significant 
by 0.1 and 2.3 percentage point, respectively. Interestingly, in both scenario, rural areas 
were more benefited than urban areas (Robilliard & Robinson, 2005). Of course, 
agricultural sector played a significant role in this situation. 
 Four years earlier, a study by Robilliard, Bourguignon, and Robinson (2001) on 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and income distribution in Indonesia using CGE model 
and microsimulation has succeeded in quantifying and disentangling the effect of the 
crisis and the global weather phenomenon (El Niño) on income inequality and poverty. 
In addition, the models also simulate the impact of introducing sets of counterfactual 
scenarios (policy packages) to alleviate the increasing poverty and income inequality 
post-crisis. The simulations’ results showed that El Niño contributed to the half increase 
of poverty indicator (i.e., HCR), while domestic credit crunch was responsible to the 
other half. The simulations also showed that social policy that focused on household 
transfer rather than food subsidy and public work program is way more efficient to 
reduce headcount poverty ratio (Robilliard, Bourguignon, & Robinson, 2001). Increase 
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in income inequality, if the findings were accurate, were mainly contributed by natural 
disaster (El Niño drought) instead of domestic or foreign credit crunch and devaluation.  
 However, an important aspect of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis has not been 
addressed by the abovementioned models. This unaddressed aspect was becoming even 
more and more crucial as eleven years later in 2008 another major event hit our economy 
again, a financial crisis we called the Great Recession. The aspect we are discussing is 
the role of financial sector and its behavior in the economy. Azis’ model (2000) 
recognized the need of incorporating this aspect a year earlier than Robilliard, 
Bourguignon, and Robinson’s model.  
 Using the balance sheets of six institutions in Indonesia, Azis specified their 
behavior in the economy. These institutions are government sector, households, 
production sector, the central bank, commercial banks, and foreign sector. This 
specification is crucial to explain the mechanism and the episode of the financial crisis 
in Indonesia that transformed into social conflict and unrest during 1997, especially in 
the hardest hit area, i.e. urban area (Azis, 2000b, 2000a). 
 One out of many desirable features of economy-wide models, especially CGE, is 
its ability to take into account price as an endogenous variable. In many developing 
countries, especially those that have undertaken economic reforms, prices are no longer 
constant but are dynamically dependent on market forces. CGE model—unlike any 
other economy-wide models such as SAM or structural path analysis (SPA)—is more 
realistic in the sense that substitutions and price changes are allowed to happen and 
therefore captured by the model’s equations. Consequently, negative multipliers are 
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allowed in the CGE’s Jacobian matrix, which is impossible in SAM and SPA. These 
features make CGE preferable to be used as a laboratory to simulate economy-wide 
impacts of policy changes and/or external shocks in developing countries. Another 
desirable feature of CGE is that it can capture not only the impacts of policy change or 
external shocks on macroeconomic variables but also on micro variables and 
intersectoral linkages (Azis, 1998). 
 The tendency to move from partial equilibrium to general equilibrium model is 
based on the idea that economy is a vast system through which all markets or sectors in 
the economy are interlocked (Dinwiddy & Teal, 1988). A change in one part of the 
economy, hence, will generate repercussion in some parts if not the whole part of the 
economy. This idea has been in the literature for decades, first introduced in 1874 by 
Leon Walras (1834-1910) through his work Éléments d'Économie Politique Pure. 
Walras explained his concept using sets of simultaneous equations that reflect how 
dynamic system solve the demand, supply, and equilibrium relations in the markets 
(Arrow & Debreu, 1954; Arrow & Hahn, 1971). 
 The evolution of computable general equilibrium model started with standard neo-
classical Walrasian general equilibrium that can be found in the linear model of 
Johansen (1960) whose concern was Norway’s welfare issue. A standard neo-classical 
CGE model assumed that economic agents behave rationally in maximizing profit and 
utility, the most efficient resource distribution is through market, market clearing always 
happens, and savings determine investments (opposed to Keynesian view). Typically, 
the neo-classical model does not require investment function to be specified. 
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 Nevertheless, in developing countries, many neo-classical assumptions often do 
not apply. Efforts to develop more realistic CGE models for developing countries has 
been progressing since the 1970s. The model development took place both in its 
functions specification and in its datasets (SAM). For CGE model, social accounting 
matrix (SAM) serves as the backbone. SAM was originally built in 1962 by the 1984’s 
Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Sir John Richard Nicholas Stone.  
 Further development of SAM for developing countries was made by Pyatt and 
Thorbecke (1976) for the International Labour Office’s (ILO) World Employment 
Programme. This further developed SAM provides clear depictions of new realities on 
the income distribution mechanism and pattern among households in the economy. 
Unlike Input-Output table which can only depict the distribution of income between 
capital owner and labor, SAM offers detailed factor and non-factor income distribution 
in the households’ level.  
 Notwithstanding, since post-liberalization and globalization era in the 1990s, 
developing countries have been facing new realities. The world is no longer a neo-
classical world. The growing role of the financial sector in the economy and the 
changing institution's behavior are too obvious to be neglected in our analysis. These 
days, institutions have more freedom to choose financial instruments to invest their net 
savings. Therefore, investments definition is no longer limited to only physical 
investments in the real sector such as land, building, and/or equipment. Our economy-
wide models must be able to capture these phenomena. The inclusion of financial 
accounts derived from the flow of funds (FOF) enables SAM as CGE’s dataset to 
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capture those phenomena. CGE model that has both financial SAM (FSAM) as dataset 
and specification of financial institution’s behavior is hereafter designated a Financial 
Computable General Equilibrium (FCGE) model.  
 Unlike CGE model, FCGE can capture the linkage between financial sector and 
real sector in the economy as well as within each sector. As mentioned before, 
Thorbecke (1991) started developing such model using Tobin’s (1969) portfolio theory 
to assess SSA scenarios’ impact in Indonesia.4 Azis’ study (2000a, 2000b) and Azis, 
Azis, and Thorbecke’s study (2001) also utilized such model to assess the effects, 
mechanism, and episodes of financial crisis that turned into social crisis during 1997-
1999 in Indonesia.5 
 Shahrier (2012) extended FCGE model of Thailand with poverty and income 
distribution block using Azis’ (2002), Manopiniwes’ (2005), and Puttanapong’s (2008) 
FCGE model as references. She used the model for investigating the effects of 
expansionary fiscal policy and monetary policy (interest rate and reserve requirement) 
on the income distribution and poverty. She found that fiscal expansion has more 
positive effects on socioeconomic indicators than expansionary monetary policy. Her 
simulation also suggested that targeted monetary policy (for the poor) cannot be 
                                                 
4 James Tobin received Nobel Prize in Economics in 1981 “for his analysis of financial markets and their 
relations to expenditure decisions, employment, production, and prices.” 
5 Iwan Azis, Erina Azis, and Erik Thorbecke concluded that the depreciating exchange rate during the 
crisis negatively affects poverty rate through price channel, while increasing interest rate worsens the 
income inequality index. Meanwhile, worsening exchange rate that was propagated with political unrest 
and pessimism has driven the economic agents to shift their portfolio away to foreign countries. These 
mechanisms along with IMF policy (increasing interest rate) deteriorated the domestic investment. Put 
together, domestic investment stagnation, higher price, drought caused by El-Nino, and more expensive 
intermediate input brought down the aggregate demand and supply. 
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standalone policy to alleviate poverty and inequality in Thailand. She pointed out that 
such policy should be accompanied by institutional change and human capital 
investments (Shahrier, 2012).  
 Waluyo (2017) developed a static financial interregional computable general 
equilibrium (FIRCGE) model for Indonesia using Indonesian financial interregional 
social accounting matrix (FIRSAM) of 2005 to evaluate the impacts of world crude oil 
price decline during 2015-2016 on the regional macro variables and income distribution. 
He also aimed to assess various policy scenarios to address the repercussions of that 
external shock. His simulations showed that Sumatra was among the most affected 
region. It happened as this region has the largest share of oil and gas productions in 
Indonesia.  
 Regarding policy choices, his simulations suggested that iso-loss curve of targeted 
policy is more efficient in addressing the economic and social impact of the shock 
compared to non-targeted policy. This iso-loss curve represents sets of joint strategy 
choices for Indonesian central bank (monetary authority) and the government (fiscal 
authority) with interest rate reduction and government expenditure as proxies. Waluyo 
emphasizes that targeting the hardest hit will help government allocate its resource 
(budget) more efficiently so that budgetary pressure can be reduced. However, it 
depends on how central bank and government coordinate to choose which sets of 
interest rate and fiscal stimulus in the iso-loss curve to be exercised (Waluyo, 2017).  
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CHAPTER 3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 Quantifying the immediate outcome of tax amnesty policy in the short-run is quite 
straightforward. On the contrary, estimating the impact of the outcome on the whole 
economy is more complicated, let alone its distributional effects. It definitely requires 
extra efforts and more reliable tools. For more comprehensive policy evaluations, these 
tools or models should be able to provide not only partial equilibrium analysis but also 
general equilibrium for the interaction between production sectors, factor markets, 
institutions, and capital or financial markets within the economy, as well as with the rest 
of the world. Moreover, the models should be also able to simulate counterfactuals. A 
“before-after” approach, therefore, is not preferable due to its limited capability in 
isolating the impact of tax amnesty policy from other shocks/events that happen 
simultaneously with that policy. 
 Of three factors contributing to the delay in the evaluation of Indonesia's tax 
amnesty policy implementation, two will be addressed by this study. The first factor is 
fiscal agency inability (if not reluctance) to perform economy-wide impacts analysis on 
tax amnesty. This reluctance leads to a mismatch between evaluations as expected by 
Law No.26/2016 and as provided by the government. Tax agency only measures the size 
of asset repatriation and extra gross tax revenue collected from the amnesty.  
 The second factor is the unavailability of structural analysis on income tax and 
redistribution system in the economy. This analysis helps us to understand who pays 
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tax, who gets what, and how tax amnesty should be designed. The third factor that is the 
measurement of tax agency performance and capacity will not be the subject of this 
thesis due to lack of access to sensitive information on tax law enforcement. 
  Law No.11 of 2016 on Tax Amnesty specifically emphasizes two key aspects:  
No. Key aspects Specific objectives Proxies 
    
1. Macroeconomic Boosting economic growth and 
restructuring the economy through 
asset repatriation 
a. Domestic liquidity 
 
 
b. Exchange rate 
 
 
c. Interest rate 
 
 
d. Domestic investments 
 
   
2. Equity More equitable tax system (not specifically mentioned) 
        
Table 1 - Two Key Aspects of Indonesian Tax Amnesty per Law No.11/2016 
 This study utilizes and closely follows the Financial Computable General 
Equilibrium (FCGE) model developed by Azis (2002) to evaluate the abovementioned 
key aspects of the Law. Firstly, the study aims to assess the medium-run impacts of 
Indonesia’s third tax amnesty policy outcomes on proxies mentioned in the Law, on 
other macroeconomic variables, and on socioeconomic indicators (income distribution 
and unemployment). Secondly, simulations of six counterfactual scenarios in this study 
aim to assess the impact on the economy and social indicators of sets of tax amnesty 
policies targeting at specific institutions in the economy.  
3.1. Data 
 Generally, Financial Social Accounting Matrix (FSAM) can serve either as a 
model or as a dataset for another model (e.g. SPA or FCGE). As a model, FSAM 
generates sets of accounting multipliers that quantify the direct and indirect impacts of 
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a shock or policy change in the economy. It answers the “what” question, unfortunately 
without providing answers for the “how” question, i.e. the mechanism on how the shock 
works. In other words, as a model, FSAM provides a “black box” for its users.  
 To open this “black box,” a more advanced economy-wide model such as FCGE 
is required. Therefore, in this thesis, FSAM will function as the latter, i.e. serving as a 
dataset for FCGE model instead of as a standalone model. The latest Indonesian FSAM 
of 2005 is publicly available on the Indonesian central bank official website.6 
 SAM contains information derived from Leontief’s Input-Output table (IO) and 
socio-economic survey data. FSAM combined SAM with flow-of-funds (FOF) data. 
Therefore, FSAM can capture the interrelation between (and within) real sector, social 
sector, and financial sector in the economy.  
        Spending 
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Figure 3 - The Structure of FSAM 
 Figure 3 shows the circular flow of economy, starts from production activities (P-
P) that need intermediate inputs and primary inputs (capital and labor) to create value 
                                                 
6 Indonesian FSAM of 2005 was built by Bank Indonesia, Statistics Indonesia, and Ministry of Finance 
with Iwan J. Azis acted as one of the advisors. It was published in May 2008 (for the Bahasa version) and 
in July 2009 (for the English version). For further details on the content of 2005 FSAM, check: 
https://www.bi.go.id/en/publikasi/lain/lainnya/Pages/FSAM.aspx 
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added (P-F) toward distribution of factor incomes in return of capital and labor services 
provision by institutions (F-I) then continue to institutional transfer such as households’ 
or enterprises’ tax payments to government (I-I) so that eventually they can use their 
disposable income to consume commodities (I-P) produced by industries (P-P). Figure 
3 also shows that institutions’ capital account (KA) in the FSAM matrix consists of 
savings (I-KA) and investments (KA-P) of which each is disaggregated into two 
categories. On the one hand, savings that are sourced from real sector (“savings”, I-KA) 
and/or from financial sector (“liabilities”, FA-KA), on the other hand, investments that 
are allocated to the real sectors (“fixed investment”, KA-P) and/or to financial sector 
(“financial asset”, KA-FA).  
 Therefore, total investments by institutions (households, enterprise, government, 
the central bank, and the rest of the world) in the FSAM matrix are composed of 
investments in physical forms (fixed asset) in real sector and in the form of financial 
instruments in the loanable funds market. All institutions report their investments on the 
left-hand side of their balance sheet. Whereas, their total savings that consist of two 
components (i.e., savings and wealth) are reported on the right-hand side of the balance 
sheet. The format of the latest Indonesian FSAM is summarized in Figure 4. 
 Area 1 as shown in Figure 4 depicts the real economies as described by SAM 
(excluding savings and fixed investments). Area 2 indicates the contribution of the 
central bank, households, corporations (i.e., non-financial, banks, and non-bank 
entities), and government to the fixed gross capital formation or investments in the real 
sector. Area 3 shows the flow of financial instruments in the loanable funds market. 
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Figure 4 - The Format of Indonesian FSAM (2005) 
 The Indonesian FSAM published by Statistics Indonesia and Bank Indonesia is 
originally a 79 x 79 matrix. For simplicity, the commodities produced by informal and 
formal sectors in the economy are aggregated. Hence, FSAM for FCGE model’s dataset 
in this study is a 70 x 70 matrix that captures the linkages between and within 2 
production factors (F), 9 institutions (I), 9 production activities including 9 domestic 
commodities and 9 foreign commodities (P), 9 institutions’ capital accounts (KA), 17 
financial instruments that are available in Indonesia’s financial markets (FA), trade 
margins and transport costs, and indirect taxes and subsidies.  
 The abovementioned data system will also be used to delineate the structure of tax 
and redistribution system in Indonesia in 2005 (the baseline). The delineation helps us 
to understand the allocation of tax burden in the economy, particularly income taxes, to 
nine institutions mentioned in the FSAM matrix. The latest Indonesian SAM of 2008 
will also be used to check whether any major change in the structure has occurred. 
Source: Statistics Indonesia and Bank Indonesia (2009) 
AREA 1 
AREA 2 
AREA 3 
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Figure 5 below shows the share of taxes paid by institutions in 2005 and 2008. Whereas 
Figure 6 shows the opposite, that is the allocation of tax revenue collected by the 
government to eight institutions in the economy. 
 Other data namely the rupiah value of asset repatriation and gross tax revenue 
collected from the third Indonesian tax amnesty are also required. These data help us to 
determine the magnitude of the shocks that will be imposed to the model. The data is 
publicly available on to the official website of Directorate General of Tax (DGT) as 
illustrated in Figure 7 below.7 
 
Figure 5 - Tax Contributions 2005 (outer) and 2008 (inner) by Institutions 
                                                 
7 All information on the procedures of the third Indonesia’s tax amnesty, including the statistics of 
foreign asset repatriation, domestic and foreign asset declaration, and gross revenue collection are 
available on http://www.pajak.go.id/content/amnesti-pajak 
Source: Indonesian SAM 2005 and SAM 2008 
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Figure 6 - Tax Revenue Allocation 2005 (outer) and 2008 (inner) by Institutions 
 
Figure 7 - Asset Repatriation and Gross Tax Revenue Collected from Indonesian Tax Amnesty 2016-2017 
Source: Directorate General of Taxes | www.pajak.go.id 
Source: Indonesian SAM 2005 and SAM 2008 
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3.2. Methodology 
3.2.1. The Financial Computable General Equilibrium Model 
 Under the unrealistic assumption of ceteris paribus, “before-after” approach for 
policy evaluation or impact analysis often ignores other events that simultaneously 
occur with the observed shocks. The inability to precisely isolate and disentangle the 
observed shock from many other causes, thus, become a major drawback for this 
approach. This drawback hinders analyst to provide robust explanation on what and how 
things are affecting the economy and the society. Consequently, reliable sets of policy 
solutions are rarely obtained from this method.  
 In contrast, Financial Computable General Equilibrium is capable of doing 
counterfactual analysis, in other words, examining changes in a country’s economy and 
socio-economy “with and without” a particular shock. The FCGE model goes beyond 
the “before-after” approach. It provides a multiplier analysis that can describe the 
transaction channels and transmission mechanism on how external shocks and/or policy 
changes affect the whole economy and economic agents’ behavior. 
 As mentioned earlier, this thesis’ model closely follows the FCGE model 
developed by Azis (2002) for the Indonesian economy. Some equations are slightly 
modified8 to introduce asset repatriations placement into four specific financial 
instruments and to incorporate gross tax amnesty penalties collection.9 The model 
                                                 
8 Three modifications of equations in income block as well as in the financial module (including the 
GAMS codes) are listed in Appendix 1. 
9 The four financial instruments are (1) working capital credit, (2) investment credit, (3) consumer 
credit, and (4) government bond. 
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consists of two modules namely core CGE module and financial module. Put together, 
these modules consist of 10 blocks of 88 sets of equations as listed in Table 2 below. 
The detailed equations and variables for each block are listed in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 2 - Blocks of Equations in FCGE Model 
 The core module is composed of 8 blocks of sets of equations. These are 
production block (18 equations), price block (11 equations), income block (5 equations), 
expenditure block (15 equations), market clearing block (3 equations), gross domestic 
products (2 equations), distortion block (7 equations), and transfer block (4 equations). 
Financial module, on the other hand, incorporates financial block (7 equations) and 
currency/demand deposit block (16 equations). All these 10 blocks are interlocked. The 
interconnection is graphically illustrated in Appendix 2. 
 It is important to bear in mind that unlike any other CGE models that often assume 
perfect competition and constant return to scale (CRS), FCGE model in this paper has 
already taken into account imperfect competition which is obvious in many developing 
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countries (see 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑄𝑖 equation in the distortion block
10). In addition, the model has 
also considered non-constant return to scales in the production block.  
3.2.1.1. Production Block 
 This block resembles the supply side of the Indonesian economy’s real sector in 
the process of producing outputs. Two stages of production process are structured as 
sets of nested constants elasticity of substitution (CES) functions, as shown in Figure 8. 
Firstly, the industrial demand for primary inputs (i.e., labor and capital) will determine 
the value-added (𝑉𝐴) of industry 𝑖. Secondly, total domestic outputs will be determined 
by the combination between 𝑉𝐴𝑖 and the composite of intermediate inputs derived from 
the Armington’s (1969) CES function of domestically produced and imported inputs.  
 
Figure 8 - Production Structure 
                                                 
10 Equation for Imperfect Competition (𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑄𝑖) is defined as 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 = 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑓𝑖  𝑃𝐷𝑖  𝐷𝑖 , where 
impf is imperfect distortion parameter, PD is price for domestic consumption, and D is the quantity of 
domestic consumption. 
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 The price of capital and labor (wage rates or 𝑊𝐹𝑓) influence the optimization of 
sectoral demand for primary inputs in the factor demand equation (factdeq) at the stage 
where 𝑉𝐴𝑖 is to be determined (left hand side of Figure 8). Firms minimize their capital 
and labor related costs to get their desired optimum composite of value added (𝑉𝐴𝑖) 
given the price of value added (𝑃𝑉𝑖). Equation (1) below shows the abovementioned 
factor demand equation:  
Equation (1) - Factor demand function 
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴𝑖 (
𝑃𝑉𝑖 𝑏𝑣𝑖,𝑓
𝑊𝐹𝑓 𝑤𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑓 (𝑎𝑣𝑥𝑖 𝑎𝑣𝑖)𝜌𝑣𝑖
)
1
(1+𝜌𝑣𝑖)
 
where parameter 𝜌𝑣𝑖  captures the production elasticity of value added for sector i and 
parameter 𝑤𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑓 captures the reality in which wage rates varies across sectors. The 
𝑎𝑣𝑥𝑖, 𝑎𝑣𝑖 and 𝑏𝑣𝑖,𝑓 are value added parameter, its distortion, and intersectoral mobility 
of factor, respectively.  
 At the second stage of the production nest, 𝑉𝐴𝑖 and intermediate inputs’ demand 
(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖) are derived to get the sectoral domestic output (𝑋𝑖) as the following:  
Equation (2) - Value added definition 
𝑉𝐴𝑖 = 𝑎𝑣𝑥𝑖 𝑎𝑣𝑖 (∑ 𝑏𝑣𝑖,𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑓
−𝜌𝑣𝑖
𝑓
)
−1
𝜌𝑣𝑖
 
Equation (3) - Intermediate goods (VA equation) 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 = 𝑉𝐴𝑖 (
𝑃𝑉𝑖 (1 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖)
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖  𝑏𝑖𝑖
)
1
(1+𝜌𝑖𝑖)
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Equation (4) - Sectoral output function 
𝑋𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑏𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝐴𝑖
−𝜌𝑖𝑖 +  (1 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖) 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖
−𝜌𝑖𝑖)
−1
𝜌𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑃𝑉𝑖, 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖, 𝑏𝑖𝑖, and 𝜌𝑖𝑖 represent price of value added, price of intermediate 
inputs, distributional parameter, and sectoral elasticity of substitution for intermediate 
inputs, respectively.  
 The gross sectoral domestic outputs then transform into commodities for domestic 
consumption (𝐷𝑖) and/or export (𝐸𝑖) with price 𝑃𝐷𝑖 and 𝑃𝐸𝑖, respectively. The 
transformation process is no other than firms allocate their domestic outputs to domestic 
and international market constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function as shown 
in the equation (5) below:  
Equation (5) - CET function 
𝑋𝑖 = 𝑎𝑥𝑖(𝑏𝑥𝑖 𝐷𝑖
−𝜌𝑥𝑖 +  (1 − 𝑏𝑥𝑖) 𝐸𝑖
𝜌𝑥𝑖)
1
𝜌𝑥𝑖 
where 𝑎𝑥𝑖, 𝑏𝑥𝑖 and 𝜌𝑥𝑖 are shift, distributive, and elasticity of substitution parameters, 
respectively. Total supply of goods is composed of domestically produced goods (𝐷𝑖) 
and imported goods (𝑀𝑖). CES function for the relation between 𝐷𝑖 and 𝑀𝑖 applies 
similarly like the CET function, as shown in the equation (6) below:  
Equation (6) - Armington function 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑎𝑞𝑖(𝑏𝑞𝑖 𝐷𝑖
−𝜌𝑞𝑖 +  (1 − 𝑏𝑞𝑖) 𝑀𝑖
−𝜌𝑞𝑖)
−1
𝜌𝑞𝑖 
More detailed sets of equations for the implication of CET and CES function and firms’ 
revenue maximization are listed in Appendix 1. 
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3.2.1.2. Price Block 
 The price block specifies the domestic price of exported (𝑃𝐸𝑖) and imported 
commodities (𝑃𝑀𝑖) as functions of the world price of export (𝑃𝑊𝐸𝑖) and import 
(𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑖), export tax/subsidy (𝑡𝑒𝑖 or 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑖), import tax/subsidy (𝑡𝑚𝑖 or 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖), trade 
and transport margin of import (𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑖), and exchange rate (𝐸𝑋𝑅). Equation (7) and (8) 
below shows 𝑃𝐸𝑖 and 𝑃𝑀𝑖, respectively: 
Equation (7) - Domestic price of exported commodities 
𝑃𝐸𝑖 = 𝑃𝑊𝐸𝑖  
𝐸𝑋𝑅
(1 + 𝑡𝑒𝑖 − 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑖)
 
Equation (8) - Domestic price of imported commodities 
𝑃𝑀𝑖 = 𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑖  𝐸𝑋𝑅 (1 + 𝑡𝑚𝑖 − 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑖) 
 As the goods available for sale are composed of domestically produced goods (𝐷𝑖) 
and imported goods (𝑀𝑖), the value can be specified with the following equation: 
Equation (9) - Absorption (the value of Armington Composite Goods) 
𝑄𝑖 𝑃𝑄𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖  𝑃𝐷𝑖 + 𝑀𝑖 𝑃𝑀𝑖   
Equation (10) - The value of domestic output 
𝑋𝑖 𝑃𝑋𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖  𝑃𝐷𝑖(1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 − 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑓𝑖) + 𝐸𝑖 𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖  
Equation (10) specifies the value of domestically produced goods that are available for 
domestic consumption and export as a function of the quantity (𝐷𝑖) and the price (𝑃𝐷𝑖) 
of sectoral outputs for domestic consumption and for export (𝐸𝑖 and 𝑃𝐸𝑖), indirect 
domestic tax (𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖), domestic trade and transport margins (𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖), imperfect distortions 
(𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑓𝑖), and sectoral subsidies (𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖).  
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 Prices of value added, capital goods, and intermediate inputs mentioned earlier in 
the production block are defined in here. Equation (11) - (14) show the definition of 
capital goods price (𝑃𝐾𝑖), the price of value added (𝑃𝑉𝑖), the domestically produced and 
imported intermediate inputs price (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 and 𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖), respectively. 
Equation (11) - The price of sectoral capital goods 
𝑃𝐾𝑖 = ∑  𝑃𝑄𝑗 [𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑖]
𝑗
  
The price of capital goods for sector i is capital good from sector j to sector i in the 
capital matrix (𝑐𝑎𝑝) as a share of the price of Armington Composite Goods. 
Equation (12) - The price of value added 
𝑃𝑉𝑖 =
(𝑋𝑖 𝑃𝑋𝑖 − 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖  𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖) 
𝑉𝐴𝑖
 
The sectoral price of value added is the difference between the value of domestic outputs 
and the value of both domestically produced and imported intermediate goods with 
respect to its value added. 
Equation (13) - The price of domestically produced intermediate inputs 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑖 𝑃𝑄𝑗
𝑗
  
Equation (14) - The price of imported intermediate inputs 
𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑗,𝑖 𝑃𝑄𝑗
𝑗
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Whereas the intermediate input of sector i is the Input-Output coefficient of intermediate 
good demand from sector j to i multiplied by the price of Armington Composite Goods. 
Finally, the price index (𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋) is defined as the ratio of GDP to real GDP. 
3.2.1.3. Income Block 
 This block defines the incomes acquired by households, government (gin), non-
government domestic institution (ngi), and foreign institution (fr). Since income is 
taxable, the direct tax function will also be specified in this block. Equation (15) – (19) 
show the specification of factor income (𝑌𝐹𝑓), government income (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛), non-
government domestic income (𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑖), foreign income (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑓𝑟), and direct 
taxes collected by government from domestic institutions (𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛), respectively. 
Equation (15) - Factor income 
𝑌𝐹𝑓 = ∑ (𝑊𝐹𝑓  𝑤𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑓)
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝑌𝐹𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑓,𝑓𝑟
𝑓𝑟
  
Income from labor service and/or capital utilization f is defined as the sectoral sum 
product of average factor price and factor demand across sectors in addition to the 
summation of factor income earned from the rest of the world.   
Equation (16) - Government income 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛 = ∑ (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑓 𝑌𝐹𝑓)
𝑓
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2
𝑖𝑛2
+ (𝑔𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ∑ (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 + 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖)
𝑖
)  
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Government income consists of factor income, transfer from institutions in the form of 
direct taxes or other non-direct tax transfers, and government agency share of the 
indirect taxes and tariffs collection. 
Equation (17) - Non-government domestic income 
𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑖 = ∑ (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑓 𝑌𝐹𝑓)
𝑓
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑖𝑛2
𝑖𝑛2
  
Non-government (households and private enterprises) income is composed of factor 
income and inter-institutional transfers including (but not limited to) cash/in-kind 
transfers from government, inter-household transfer, philanthropy, return on financial 
assets, remittance, etc.  
Equation (18) - Foreign income 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑓𝑟 = ∑ (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟,𝑓 𝑌𝐹𝑓)
𝑓
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑓𝑟,𝑖𝑛2
𝑖𝑛2
+ (𝑚𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑟 ∑ (𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑖 𝐸𝑋𝑅 𝑀𝑖)
𝑖
)  
Foreign income includes factor income transferred to foreign institutions, institutional 
transfers, and foreign institutions share of income from imports in domestic currency.  
Equation (19) - Direct taxes* 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛 = 𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑛 𝒕𝒂𝒙𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒈𝒊𝒏,𝒅𝒊𝒏  
 The above direct tax equation defines tax collection through which specific direct 
tax rates (𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛) applies to all domestic households and corporates income 
(𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑛 ). This equation is marked with asterisk (*) to show that a modification from its 
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original form has been conducted in this thesis to introduce the shock of extra tax 
revenue collection from tax amnesty. A new parameter (𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛), hence, is 
introduced to modify the original direct tax equation. Taxfact or tax factor parameter 
acts as a modifier for direct tax collection in case of a change in tax policy has occurred 
(e.g. Indonesian tax amnesty that yields a 15% increase in tax revenue). Put simply, the 
new parameter (𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡) allows modelers to modify the size of transfers originated 
from domestic institutions (𝑑𝑖𝑛) to government (𝑔𝑖𝑛) in the form of direct tax. This is 
a major distinction and a departure from the original non-tax amnesty FCGE model. 
 Later on, the depiction on how extra tax revenues collected from the Indonesian 
tax amnesty affects selected economic and social indicators will be discussed in 
Subchapter 4.2. The detailed explanation for the equation modification including the 
GAMS code is discussed in Appendix 1. 
3.2.1.4. Expenditure Block 
 The expenditure block explains the behavior of economic agents in consuming 
commodities or services and in investing their net-worth. Four expenditures by 
institutions are specified in this block. These are household, government, non-
government, and foreign expenditures.  
 Households expenditure includes spending for consumption, direct tax, and 
transfers to other domestic or foreign institutions. Their consumption behavior can be 
specified as a function of household’s disposable income and marginal propensity to 
consume (1 - marginal propensity to save). Equation (20) and (21) below shows those 
specifications: 
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Equation (20) - Household expenditure 
  𝐸𝑋𝑃ℎ = 𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ + ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,ℎ𝑔𝑖𝑛 + ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑛𝑔𝑖,ℎ𝑛𝑔𝑖 + ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑓𝑟,ℎ𝑓𝑟  
Equation (21) - Household consumption behavior 
𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ = (𝐼𝑁𝐶ℎ − ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,ℎ
𝑔𝑖𝑛
) (1 − 𝑚𝑝𝑠ℎ)
− (∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑛𝑔𝑖,ℎ
𝑛𝑔𝑖
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑓𝑟,ℎ
𝑓𝑟
) 
 Government expenditure is a function of government agency share of expenditure 
(𝑔𝑔𝑠ℎ𝑟) in consuming goods/services from sector i or allocating subsidy to sector i, and 
government transfer to institutions. This function is shown in Equation (22) below. 
Equation (22) - Government expenditure 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑛 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 (∑ (𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑄𝑖)
𝑖
+ ∑ (𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖 + 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐸𝑖 + 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀𝑖)
𝑖
)
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛
 
 Non-government expenditure consists of any spending of enterprises to other 
institutions in the economy as specified in the following equation: 
Equation (23) - Non-government expenditure 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑜 = ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑛𝑛𝑜
𝑖𝑛
 
 Foreign expenditure is defined as the spending by foreign institutions for 
exporting goods/services from domestic sector i, for paying the costs of factors, and for 
inter-institutional transfers. The equation of foreign expenditure is the following:  
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Equation (24) - Foreign expenditure 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑓𝑟 = 𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑟 ∑ (𝑃𝑊𝐸𝑖 𝐸𝑋𝑅 𝐸𝑖)
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝑌𝐹𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑓,𝑓𝑟
𝑓
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑓𝑟
𝑖𝑛
 
 The investment behavior of economic agents is specified in equation (25) – (27): 
Equation (25) - Private domestic investment 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 𝑉𝐴𝑖
𝜆1𝑖𝜆0𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛(1 + 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁)
𝜆2𝑖  𝐸𝑋𝑅𝜆3𝑖 
𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 =
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑁𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠
∑ ∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠
 
where 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 is average real interest rate, 𝜆s are constants, 𝑅𝑁𝑎𝑠 is financial asset’s 
rate of return, and 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔 is the initial value of asset stock. 
Equation (26) - Investment by origin 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 = ∑ 𝐷𝐾𝑗[𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑗]
𝑗
 
Equation (26) suggests that the utilization of capital for investment is determined by the 
coefficient in the capital matrix in the FSAM dataset and the initial quantity of capital. 
Equation (27) - Investment by destination 
𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑃𝐾𝑖 = 𝑘𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 = ∑ ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛𝑖
 
Finally, equation (27) shows that the value of investment in the destination sector—
where 𝐷𝐾𝑖 and 𝑃𝐾𝑖 are the quantity and the price of capital by sector of destination, 
respectively—is proportional (𝑘𝑠ℎ𝑟) with fixed investment.   
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3.2.1.5. Market Clearing Block 
 The market clearing block serves as a follow-up after the behavior of the economic 
agents has been specified in the previous blocks. It contains three equations that 
equilibrate the demand side and the supply side of goods market, labor market, and 
capital market. The following equations define those equilibria: 
Equation (28) - Equilibrium in goods market 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄𝑖 + 𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝐺𝐷𝑖 + 𝐼𝐷𝑖 +
𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑋𝑖
𝑃𝑄𝑖
 
where 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄𝑖, 𝐶𝑑𝑖, 𝐺𝑑𝑖, and 𝐼𝑑𝑖 are sectoral intermediate inputs demand, private 
consumption, government consumption, and investment demand, respectively. While 
𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑋𝑖 and 𝑃𝑄𝑖 are the received trade/transport margins and the price of Armington 
composite goods. 
Equation (29) - Equilibrium in capital market 
𝐹𝑆𝑓 = ∑ 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑓
𝑖
 
Equation (30) - Equilibrium in labor market 
𝐿𝑆 = (1 + 𝑈𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅) ∑ 𝐹𝑆𝑓𝑙
𝑓𝑙
 
where 𝐹𝑆𝑓, 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑓, 𝑈𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅, 𝐿𝑆, and 𝐹𝑆𝑓𝑙 are capital supply, factor demand, 
unemployment rate, labor supply, and factor supply of labor, respectively. 
3.2.1.6. GDP Block 
 The gross domestic products block consists of two GDP functions specification. 
These are total gross domestic products based on value-added including tax (𝐺𝐷𝑃) and 
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real gross domestic products (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃). Equation (31) and (32) below show the detailed 
specification of those functions. 
Equation (31) - GDP based on VA 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = ∑ (𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑃𝑉𝑖 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 + 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖 − 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖 − 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀𝑖)
𝑖
 
where 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀𝑖 is subsidies for import. 
Equation (32) - Real GDP 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 = ∑ (𝐶𝑑𝑖 + 𝐺𝑑𝑖 + 𝐼𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝐸𝑖
𝑖
− ∑ 𝑀𝑖(1 − 𝑇𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙0𝑖)
𝑖
)
𝑖
 
where 𝑇𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙0𝑖 is tariffs and trade and transport margins (ttm) in real value. 
3.2.1.7. Distortion Block 
 The distortion block contains any interference to perfect competition in the 
market. These interferences include indirect tax (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖), import tariff, export subsidy 
(𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐸𝑖), import subsidy (𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀𝑖), trade and transport margins on domestic (𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖) 
or imported commodities (𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖), and imperfect market distortions (𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑓𝑖). The 
detailed equations are listed in Appendix 1. 
3.2.1.8. Transfer Block 
 This block describes total inter-institutional transfers (𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁) from various 
sources. These include transfer from institutions to government (𝐺𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁) in the form 
of direct tax, financial returns transfer to institutions (𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁), and other transfer 
(𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁). The following equations specify all those kinds of inter institutional 
transfers: 
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Equation (33) - Total institutional transfers 
𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 = 𝐺𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 + 𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 + 𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 
𝐺𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛 = 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛 
𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁ℎ,𝑖𝑛2 = 𝑅𝑁𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ  ∑ (𝑅𝑁𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛2,𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛)
𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛
 
where 𝑅𝑁𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛 is rate of return on earning asset (i.e. 12 financial instruments mentioned 
in Indonesian FSAM matrix). 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔 and 𝑅𝑁𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 are the value of liability stocks 
and the share of institutional financial asset, respectively. The following equation 
specifies the institutional 𝑅𝑁𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒: 
𝑅𝑁𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛 =
∑ (𝑅𝑁𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛,𝑖𝑛)𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛
∑ ∑ (𝑅𝑁𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛,𝑖𝑛2)𝑖𝑛2𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛
 
3.2.1.9. Financial Module 
 One important aspect of financial module that distinguishes FCGE from CGE is 
the definition of total investment and total saving. In FCGE model, 𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺 is 
acquired not only by saving from the real sector but also by financial liability owed 
from the financial sector. On the other hand, 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 is composed of not solely fixed 
asset investment in the real sector, but also of financial asset investment in the financial 
sector. These distinctions are clearly specified with the following equations:  
Equation (34) - Total savings and investments 
𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 + ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠
𝑎𝑠
 
𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 = 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑛 + ∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛
𝑎𝑠
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Either in CGE or FCGE, both accounts are required to be in equilibrium:  
Equation (35) - Institution's asset balance 
𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 
 Put simply, FCGE is CGE plus (financial) asset and liabilities. Hence, additional 
equations specification to capture the economic agents’ behavior in allocating their 
funds to financial asset and liabilities is needed. The specification is derived, especially, 
from the Flow-of-Funds (FOF) dataset which provides information on the asset and 
liabilities of economic agents. The behavioral equation is no other than linkages 
between assets, liabilities, and the rate of return (interest rate)—whether as flow (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
/ 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏) or as current/past stock (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆 / 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆 / 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔 / 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔).  
Equation (36) - Asset & liability at the end of period (current balance) 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛 = 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠 = 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠 + 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠 
Equation (37) - Allocation behavior 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠𝑡1,𝑖𝑛 = 𝜃1𝑎𝑠𝑡1,𝑖𝑛  (
𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑡1
𝑟𝑛0𝑎𝑠𝑡1
)
𝜎1𝑎𝑠𝑡1,𝑖𝑛
 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡1 = 𝜃2𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡1  (
𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑡1
𝑟𝑛0𝑎𝑠𝑡1
)
𝜎2𝑎𝑠𝑡1,𝑖𝑛
 
Equation (37) shows that the decision making of economic agents in how they allocate 
their fund to asset or liability is determined by interest rate (𝑟𝑛), elasticity (𝜃), and (𝜎).  
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 Since our simulations include allocating the repatriated asset from tax amnesty to 
four financial instruments in the form of loan11 and government bond (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 7), two 
equations are modified from the original non-tax amnesty FCGE model as the 
following: 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡1𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒏,𝒂𝒔𝒕𝟏 = 𝑎𝑠𝑡1𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡1 (∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠𝑡1,𝑖𝑛2
𝑖𝑛2
) 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐺𝑂𝑉1,𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝒈𝒃𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝑮𝑶𝑽𝟏,𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒆 = 𝜃2𝐺𝑂𝑉1,𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒 (
𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒
𝑟𝑛0𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒
)
𝜎2𝐺𝑂𝑉1,𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒
 
Parameter 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡1 in the equation above allows us to modify the size of 
financial liabilities stocks of institutions (𝑖𝑛) in the form of loan (𝑎𝑠𝑡1).12 Whereas, 
parameter 𝑔𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒 modifies the size of financial liabilities stocks of 
government (g𝑖𝑛) in the form of government bond (𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒). On how the allocation of the 
repatriated asset affects economic and social indicators will be discussed in Subchapter 
4.2. The GAMS code for the equations modification are listed in Appendix 1. 
 Financial instruments sold by the financial sector are new sources of income for 
economic agents through which return on assets is then transferred.13 The size of this 
income is determined by both assets and liabilities stock as well as the current interest 
rate and elasticity. In the FCGE model simulation, data on the past stock of asset and 
liability (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔 and 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔) stands as separate datasets from FSAM.  
                                                 
11 Working capital (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 10), investment credit (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 11), and consumer credit (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 12). 
12 𝑎𝑠𝑡1𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡1 in the equation is an asset-share parameter which is defined as 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆0𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡1 ∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆0𝑎𝑠𝑡1,𝑖𝑛2𝑖𝑛2⁄   
13 See equation (17) in the income block 
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3.2.1.10. Model Closures 
The following variables are set to be exogenous: 
1. Government expenditures and transfers 
2. Investment (𝐼𝑁𝑉) 
3. Income from abroad (𝑦𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑤) and subsidy (𝑠𝑢𝑏) 
4. World price of export/import (𝑝𝑤𝑚/𝑝𝑤𝑒) 
5. Domestic transport and trade margins (𝑡𝑡𝑑) 
6. Marginal propensity to save (𝑚𝑝𝑠) 
7. Current account balance (𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉) 
8. Labor and non-labor factor supply (𝐿𝑆 and 𝐹𝑆) 
9. Lag of stocks in the CGE (𝑓𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔, 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡𝐿𝑎𝑔) and in the financial module 
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔, 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔). 
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CHAPTER 4 SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
 Having discussed the construction of FCGE model for tax amnesty, this chapter 
covers policy experiments with FCGE model simulations. The experiments are 
conducted to achieve three objectives. The first objective is to measure the impact on 
macroeconomic variables and income distribution of having tax amnesty and of not 
having tax amnesty policy. As mentioned earlier in the previous chapter in Table 1, two 
key aspects of Law No.11/2016 on Tax Amnesty are macroeconomic measure and equity 
measure. These measures become central issues to be evaluated. 
 The second objective of the experiments is to explain how and why tax amnesty 
affects the macroeconomic and socioeconomic condition in Indonesia by using FCGE 
framework. The last objective of the experiment is to compare the simulation results of 
seven policy scenarios using two criteria, i.e. macroeconomic indicators and equity 
measures. For macroeconomic criteria, the Law specifically mentioned 4 (four) proxies 
to be used as parameters to measure the effects of two quantifiable direct consequences 
of Indonesia’s third tax amnesty policy, i.e. asset repatriation and extra gross tax 
revenue. These macroeconomic proxies are domestic liquidity, exchange rate, interest 
rate, and domestic investment. In addition, our model also provides some alternative 
proxies such as real GDP (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃), consumption (𝐶𝐷), Export (𝐸), import (𝑀), price 
index (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥), government income (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒), and income tax revenue (𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥). 
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 For equity criteria, the Law did not specifically mention any proxy. However, the 
model provides two good proxies that can be used to measure equitable income 
distribution and another socioeconomic indicator such as unemployment (𝑈𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒). 
On equity, the proxies are income distribution between residents who live in rural area 
and in urban area (𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑈) as well as income distribution between the rich households 
and the poor households (𝑌𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐿𝐻).  
4.1. On the Magnitude of the Tax Amnesty’s Outcome 
This subsection attempts to compare the magnitude of two direct outcomes of 
tax amnesty policy across time within Indonesia and cross-countries. The most 
observable direct outcome is gross tax revenue collection. However, since the policy 
objective of the third Indonesian Tax Amnesty is not merely tax revenue collection but 
also macroeconomic objective, consequently, new outcome emerges. This new outcome 
is asset repatriation through which Indonesian citizens’ liquid assets in foreign country 
are transferred back to Indonesia. The government requires these repatriated assets to 
be invested legally in financial instruments that are available in the country. As 
mentioned earlier in subchapter 3.2, this thesis assigns four financial instruments to be 
points of destination for the allocation of that repatriated assets. These are working 
capital credit (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 10), investment credit (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 11), consumer credit (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 12), and 
government bond (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 7). The reason why those four instruments are selected is 
because they affect real sector differently and have different level of risks. 
Compared to the first (1965) and the second (1984) tax amnesty, Indonesian 
third tax amnesty (2016) is a success story in terms of gross tax revenue collection. Tax 
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amnesty in 2016 collected 10 times larger gross tax revenue than the first tax amnesty 
in 1965. Figure 9 below shows the comparison of revenue collection within the country 
across time: 
 
Figure 9 - Indonesia's Gross Revenue Collection (1965-2016) 
Official reports published by Directorate General of Tax (DGT) shows that in only 8 
months tax amnesty program in 2016 succeeded in collecting about 135 billion IDR. In 
contrast, the tax amnesty in 1965 can be considered unsuccessful. Kompas Daily, in 
1965, captured this first tax amnesty policy failure by citing Hussein Kartasasmita’s 
statement (the head of Jakarta Financial Inspection at that time) that until July 24, 1965, 
tax revenue collection was only 12 billion IDR, less than half of its target.14  
The second tax amnesty policy in 1984 in the era of President Soeharto regime 
had the same story with the 1965’s tax amnesty. Indonesia was facing budget pressure 
                                                 
14 Kompas, “Hari Terachir Pengampunan Padjak 17 Agustus 1965,” Kompas, Jakarta, August 5, 1965. 
Note: no data on 1984’s tax amnesty is available. 
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as its oil export-driven economic performance declined and shocked by the world 
recession and oil price crisis. With almost 70% of the government revenue were sourced 
from oil export sector, the Indonesian economy was very vulnerable to external shocks. 
The worldwide economic recession of 1982-1983 and the declining world’s oil prices 
in 1983-1986 pushed President Soeharto to adjust the national budget deficit by 
introducing packages of tax reforms to mobilize non-oil/gas-based revenues.15  
Five laws were enacted during 1983-1985 to follow up the tax reforms plan, 
including income tax code, VAT code, property tax code, stamp duty code, and the 
fundamental law of taxation, i.e. the General Provisions and Taxation Procedures Law. 
Tax administration system radically shifts from official to self-assessment to minimize 
the cost of enforcement and to maximize tax revenue collection. Tax amnesty, in this 
context, attempted to boost short-term tax revenues and long-term tax compliance by 
targeting underground economy before tax regime change.  
By contrast, tax amnesty Law in 2016 is a completely different story. It regards 
tax revenue collection goal as the last priority. Instead, macroeconomic and equity goals 
are on the top priority list. Asset declaration and asset repatriation, therefore, emerge as 
new potential shocks for our model. Still, among those two new consequences, asset 
repatriation is the only one that has concrete and tangible feature to be introduced as a 
shock for the economy.  
                                                 
15 Cited from Iwan Azis in the Chapter 4 of The Economies of Asia, 1950-1998: Critical Perspectives 
on The World Economy, a journal published in 2000, edited by Ash and Booth. 
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To give a clearer illustration on the magnitude of tax amnesty success in terms 
of asset repatriation, the absolute dollar value in Figure 1 Chapter 1 should be 
transformed into percentage of GDP measure. Based on dollar value, until 2017, 
Indonesia’s tax amnesty was, of course, the most successful in terms of tax revenue 
collection and asset repatriation/declaration. However, based on percentage GDP, 
Argentina’s tax amnesty (2016) seems to be the most successful in terms of revenue 
collection (1.77% of GDP). Whereas, in terms of asset repatriation, Indonesia is the 
most successful (38.79% of GDP). Figure 10 below depicts the cross-country tax 
amnesty outcome in percentage of GDP: 
 
Figure 10 - Cross-country Tax Amnesty Outcome (%GDP) 
The graphical information above is presented in this section to help to estimate the 
magnitude of the shock (caused by asset repatriation) to be imposed into the model. 
1.51 
1.77 
0.04 
0.13 
0.60 
0.04 
0.61 
1.08 
0.58 
0.33 
0.24 
0.10 
0.10 
0.00 
0.04 
0.59 
-
21.41 
0.34 -
8.04 
- -
38.79 
3.67 
6.26 
3.56 
4.86 
1.12 
- - - 0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Source: IMF, World Bank, Center for Indonesia Taxation Analysis, and author's estimate
Cross-countries Tax Amnesty Outcome
as percentage of GDP
Gross Revenue Collected (%GDP) Declared & Repatriated Assets (%GDP right axis))
  
49 
 
4.2. The Shocks and the Scenarios 
 Figure 1 and Figure 10 only show the magnitude of extra tax revenue collection 
and asset repatriation from tax amnesty program. The impacts on the Indonesian 
economy and socioeconomic condition of those extra tax revenue and repatriated assets, 
however, cannot be evaluated only by looking at their magnitude. The impacts can be 
(only) measured and assessed comprehensively if those two amnesty outcomes are 
being treated as exogenous in our model. Nevertheless, the graphical illustration in both 
figures remains useful for determining the size of shocks that affect the economy.  
 Two shocks as shown in Table 3 below will be imposed on the FCGE model. 
These shocks are the following:  
 Shock #1 Shock #2 
   
Description of the shock Tax revenue increase by 15% A: Current account balance -38.79% 
B: Working capital credit increased by 40% 
C: Investment credit increased by 20% 
D: Consumer credit increased by 30% 
E: Government bond increased by 10% 
Equation/variables (𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋) (𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉) and (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 10, 11, 12, 7) 
Table 3 - The Model’s Shocks 
 The first shock is tax revenue increase caused by both normal operations and 
special event namely tax amnesty policy. This shock represents policy change through 
which new tax law (Law No.11/2016 on Tax Amnesty) yields a significant 15% increase 
in income tax revenue.16 In the FCGE model, especially in the income block, this 15% 
                                                 
16 The institutional share of the 15% tax revenue increase is assumed to be correspond with Figure 5 in 
sub chapter 3.1. Whereas for the counterfactual experiment, the institutional share of that increase will be 
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tax revenue increase will modify the size of the institutional transfer (𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑔,𝑖𝑛) to 
government, or to be specific the direct tax equation (𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋). As mentioned earlier 
in Subchapter 3.2.1.3, the detailed explanation and GAMS code for the direct tax 
equation are listed in Appendix 1. 
 The second shock is asset repatriation. As a result of this shock, current account 
balance (𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉) changes by -38.79% as shown in Figure 10. This shock is then followed 
by the allocation of the repatriated asset into four financial instruments i.e. wor,king 
capital credit (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 10 increased by 40%), investment credit (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 11 increased by 
20%), consumer credit (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 12 increased by 30%), and government bond (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 7 
increased by 10%). Hypothetically, tax amnesty policy incentivizes Indonesian citizens 
whose assets are in foreign countries (or tax havens) to put their off-shore liquid assets 
back to Indonesia’s real sector or financial sector. Consequently, economy and equity 
tend to be affected by this repatriation.  
 Experiments with FCGE simulation will be conducted to test the effects of both 
shocks—i.e., tax revenue increase and asset repatriation including its allocation to four 
financial instruments—on selected macroeconomic and socioeconomic indicators.17 
                                                 
modified to compare the impact of different policies (targeted vis-à-vis non-targeted) on the selected 
macroeconomic and socioeconomic variables. The pattern of the government expenditure, however, is 
assumed unchanged. 
17 The following 9 macroeconomic indicators will be used in the simulations: 1. RGDP, 2. Consumption 
(CD), 3. Export (E), 4. Import (M), 5. Price Index (Pindex), 6. Exchange Rate (EXR), 7. Avg. Interest 
Rate (avgrn), 8. Government income (Gincome), and 9. Income tax revenue (DIRTAX). In addition, three 
socioeconomic indicators will also be used. These include (1) Income distribution between rural and 
urban dwellers (YdistRU), (2) Income distribution between the poor and the rich (YdistLH), and (3) 
Unemployment rate (UNEMP). 
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The transmission channel through which the abovementioned shocks affect twelve 
selected economic and social indicators is illustrated in Figure 11 below: 
Figure 11 - Transmission Channel by Tax Revenue Increase and Allocation of Repatriated Asset 
 
 An increase in direct tax as a result of tax amnesty policy whose participants are 
mostly the rich, middle class, and corporation—immediately raises government income 
level which in turn influence consumption level and saving. It also tends to improve 
income distribution between the rich and the poor as the policy has a negative effect on 
the income of the policy participants. Moreover, since the policy does not specifically 
target a source of income to be taxed, in other words only collects penalties from 
taxpayers’ unreported income or asset, taxpayers’ return on assets (financial income) 
might remain untouched and therefore tend to offset the improvement of households’ 
1. Asset repatriation by the rich enhances domestic liquidity through capital inflows which in turn is captured by 
commercial banks in their balance sheet. This situation enables banks to give more loans to real sectors in the form of 
working capital credit, investment credits, and consumer credits to expand consumption and production which 
eventually might adjust the GDP, the price, and households’ income. 
2. In return for that liquidity, banks must provide return on asset (financial income) for the financial assets holders, namely 
the rich. If an increase in the rich's financial income is accompanied by inflationary pressure, the rich might be hit by 
the pressure but their regular consumption could still be sustained. Whereas the poor will be the hardest hit since 
most of their incomes are spent for basic consumption. 
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income distribution. Overall, shock from Dirtax tends to generate a negative effect on 
the income level of participants although for delinquent taxpayers the forgiveness effect 
of tax amnesty helps them to lessen the amount of tax to be paid.  
 By contrast, the second shock has more complex transmission channel. The 
inflows of liquid assets from abroad to Indonesia as result of asset repatriation are 
mostly captured by financial institutions, especially commercial banks. Consequently, 
the repatriation increases the liability side of the commercial bank’s balance sheet. In 
turn, they allocate that fresh funds from repatriation to financial instruments by giving 
loans to consumers in the forms of working capital loans, investment credits, and/or 
consumer credits to make profits. However, as a return for that funds, depends on the 
interest rates, they must transfer return on asset or financial income to the asset holders 
who are mostly the rich. This financial income effect gives tax amnesty participants not 
only forgiveness from being subjected to tax audit or investigation that might cost them 
large amount of money and time, but also additional income from their ownership of 
those three financial instruments including government bonds. Hence, taken together, 
the forgiveness effects combined with the financial effects tend to increase the income 
of economic agents, especially the rich. Consumption levels and investment also tend 
to rise, which in turn creates an expansionary effect to the economy. Exchange rate also 
tends to increase as a result of capital inflows from asset repatriation. This increase will 
influence export and import, which in turn influence the total output of production and 
composite good, followed by adjustment in price index in the economy. This price effect 
will eventually influence households’ cost of living and might worsen the income 
inequality between the rich and the poor or between rural and urban dwellers. 
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Seven scenarios composed of factual and counterfactuals will be simulated to assess the 
impacts of the shocks. These scenarios are shown in Table 4 below: 
Policy scenarios 
Experiment 
number 
Shock #1 Shock #2 
    
Without tax amnesty (TA) 1 4% tax revenue increase - 
TA: non-targeted 2.1* 15% tax revenue increase A 
 2.2* 15% tax revenue increase B, C, D, E 
TA: targeted to 
corporations 
3.1 4% tax revenue increase for:  
• all households (𝐻𝐻1 − 4),  
• government agencies (𝐺𝑂𝑉), and 
• the central bank (𝐹𝐼𝑁1) 
20% tax revenue increase for:  
• financial sector (𝐹𝐼𝑁2 and 𝐹𝐼𝑁3), and 
• real sector (𝐹𝐼𝑁4) 
A 
 3.2 Same as above B, C, D, E 
TA: targeted to the rich 
and corporations 
4.1 4% tax revenue increase for:  
• rural and urban poor (𝐻𝐻1 and 𝐻𝐻3),  
• government agencies (𝐺𝑂𝑉), and  
• the central bank (𝐹𝐼𝑁1) 
17% tax revenue increase for:  
• rural and urban rich (𝐻𝐻2 and 𝐻𝐻4), 
• financial sector (𝐹𝐼𝑁2 and 𝐹𝐼𝑁3), 
• real sector (𝐹𝐼𝑁4) 
A 
 4.2 Same as above B, C, D, E 
 
Table 4 - Seven Scenarios Covered by the Simulations 
4.3. The Simulation Results and Analysis 
 The simulation results for each shock and experiment in Table 5 and Table 6 below 
are presented relative to the base run results. As illustrated earlier in Figure 11, 
understanding the transmission mechanism or on how and why the shocks affect 
economic and social indicators is essential. In the following section, we will discuss the 
impact of each shock and experiment using Figure 11’s framework.
Note: Experiments without asterisk are counterfactual policy scenarios on selected economic and social indicators. 
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Table 5 - Non-simultaneous Simulation Results for Each Shock 
Selected Indicators 
Base 
run 
Shock #1  Shock #2: Asset Repatriation 
Extra Tax 
Revenue  
 FSAV -
38.79% 
Working 
Capital Credit 
increase by 
40% 
Investment 
Credit 
increase by 
20% 
Consumer 
Credit 
increase by 
30% 
Government 
Bond increase 
by 10% 
15% tax revenue 
increase 
  A B C D E 
         
Social:         
Income Distribution (rural-urban) 1 0.9996  0.9986 1.0112 1.0000 1.0000 1.0032 
Income Distribution (poor-rich) 1 1.0008  1.0019 0.9758 1.0000 1.0000 0.9929 
Unemployment Rate 1 1.0041  0.9673 0.8691 0.9999 0.9999 0.9514 
Macroeconomic:         
RGDP 1 0.9998  1.0017 1.0063 1.0000 1.0000 1.0024 
Consumption 1 0.9966  1.0039 1.1355 1.0001 1.0001 1.0462 
Export 1 1.0000  0.9861 1.0269 1.0000 1.0000 1.0093 
Import 1 0.9997  1.0169 0.9848 1.0000 1.0000 0.9952 
Price Index 1 0.9948  0.9798 1.1942 1.0001 1.0001 1.0484 
Exchange Rate 1 0.9948  0.9718 1.2098 1.0001 1.0001 1.0531 
Interest Rate 1 1.0005  0.9999 1.0869 1.0000 1.0000 1.0237 
Income Tax Revenue 1 1.1700  0.9827 1.1703 1.0001 1.0001 1.0426 
Total Government Income 1 1.1231  0.9841 1.1723 1.0001 1.0001 1.0430 
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Table 6 - Simulation Results for Each Experiment 
Selected Indicators 
Base 
run 
No Tax 
Amnesty 
 Non-targeted Tax Amnesty  Targeted Tax Amnesty 
Experiment 
1 
 Experiment 
2.1 
Experiment 
2.2 
 Experiment 
3.1 
Experiment 
3.2 
Experiment 
4.1 
Experiment 
4.2 
4% tax revenue 
growth   
15% tax revenue 
increase + 
capital inflows 
(FSAV) 
15% tax revenue 
increase + 
increased credits 
and government 
bond 
  
Targeting 
corporations + 
capital inflows 
(FSAV)  
Targeting 
corporations + 
increased credits 
and government 
bond 
Targeting the 
rich and 
corporations + 
capital inflows 
(FSAV) 
Targeting the 
rich and 
corporations + 
increased credits 
and government 
bond 
           
Social:           
Income Distribution (rural-urban) 1 0.9999  0.9983 1.0157  0.9958 1.0131 0.9949 1.0121 
Income Distribution (poor-rich) 1 1.0002  1.0027 0.9667  1.0080 0.9719 1.0102 0.9740 
Unemployment Rate 1 1.0010  0.9715 0.8412  1.0018 0.8569 1.0148 0.8637 
Macroeconomic:           
RGDP 1 1.0000  1.0015 1.0075  1.0001 1.0068 0.9995 1.0065 
Consumption 1 0.9992  1.0005 1.1733  0.9756 1.1586 0.9651 1.1524 
Export 1 1.0000  0.9861 1.0349  0.9862 1.0370 0.9861 1.0378 
Import 1 0.9999  1.0167 0.9791  1.0149 0.9770 1.0141 0.9762 
Price Index 1 0.9987  0.9748 1.2913  0.9413 1.2341 0.9282 1.2117 
Exchange Rate 1 0.9987  0.9669 1.3133  0.9337 1.2561 0.9207 1.2337 
Interest Rate 1 1.0001  1.0004 1.1303  1.0032 1.1348 1.0042 1.1364 
Income Tax Revenue 1 1.0415  1.1500 1.4753  2.5720 3.2663 3.3457 4.2313 
Total Government Income 1 1.0300  1.1052 1.4194  2.1369 2.7152 2.6997 3.4156 
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 Before proceeding to assess the simulation results for each experiment as shown 
in Table 6, it is necessary to check the effect of each shock listed in Table 5.  Each shock 
has different effects on the selected economic and social indicators in our model. The 
following figure shows the non-simultaneous simulation result of Shock #1 (tax revenue 
increase) and Shock #2 (asset repatriation) A, B, C, D, and E on 12 indicators: 
 
Figure 12 - The Effect of Each Shock on the Selected Indicators 
As shown above, extra tax revenue collected from tax amnesty (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #1) has no 
significant effects on all indicators except income tax revenue (17%) and total 
government income (12.31%). Instead, this shock decreases GDP by 0.54% as 
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consumption declined. The distributional effect is also insignificant as in the 
simulations; government expenditure pattern and tax structure are assumed unchanged. 
 Capital inflows through FSAV (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #2𝐴) slightly affect most of the 
macroeconomic indicators by decreasing exchange rate, export, price index, 
unemployment rate, and government income, as well as increasing import, 
consumption, and RGDP. It occurs as the inflows put pressure on the exchange rate and 
make it to appreciate by 2.8%. As a result, trade account balance (𝐸 − 𝑀) declines due 
to increased imports (1.7%) and falling exports (1.4%). The decline of unemployment 
rate might indicate that labor market has benefited from increased consumption (0.4%), 
import (1.7%), and RGDP (0.2%). Put together, increased activity in the economy as 
indicated by raising supply and demand causes the price index to adjust. The decline in 
income tax revenue (𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋) or government income might suggest that tax base i.e. 
institutions,’ income has declined as well. The income decline is indicated by the price 
index fall (2.2%) which might suggest that consumers are lack of purchasing power to 
buy imported or domestically produced commodities.  
 The third shock (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #2𝐵) of 40% increase in working capital credit has the 
largest effects on most of macroeconomic and social indicators. Working capital loan 
improves firm’s liquidity in financing routine business operations such as paying wages, 
account payable, and other short-term operational expenses. As the liquidity of both 
firms and wage earners (households) increase, the level of economic activity also 
increases as indicated by raising consumption (13.6%), GDP (0.6%), and price index 
(19.4%), as well as falling unemployment rate (13.1%). As a result, income tax revenue 
(𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋) and government income rise by 17%.  
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 However, the increased demand for working capital loan by firms needs to be 
backed up by sufficient supply of funds either domestically or from foreign countries. 
An 8.7% increase in interest rate reflects the demand and supply of such funds in the 
domestic financial market. An increase in interest rate might incentivize institutions to 
invest their funds in financial sector rather than real sector. Households who allocate 
their funds to the domestic financial market receive financial return in addition to their 
factor income. This phenomenon explains why the income distribution between rich and 
poor worsens by 2.4%, it is particularly because asset holders who earn that financial 
return are mostly rich households. By contrast, the improvement of income distribution 
between rural and urban dwellers (1.1%) indicates that the increased economic activity 
caused by increased firms’ and households’ liquidities makes rural dwellers better-off.  
 Some of the assets or funds that are needed to make the working capital loan 
available in the domestic financial market can come from foreign countries. When it 
happens, foreign institutions’ savings (𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑓𝑟) will increase. The model simulation 
suggests that 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑓𝑟 is increased by 21% from 71,942 to 87,032.4 billion IDR. This 
explain why exchange rate is depreciated by 21%, which in turn also increase export by 
2.7% and decrease import by 1.5%. 
 The simulation results for 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #2𝐶 and 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #2𝐷 yield insignificant impacts 
on selected economic and social indicators.18 Whereas shock from the 10% increase in 
government bond (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #2𝐸) affects the selected indicators through similar 
transmission mechanism with the shock from working capital credit (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #2𝐵) but 
                                                 
18 It explains why the simulation results are not presented in Figure 12. 
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with lower magnitudes. In summary, the simulations have shown that both 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #2𝐵 
and 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #2𝐸 have expansionary effects on the economy.   
Experiment 1 (No Tax Amnesty) 
 Turning now to the analysis of simulation results for each experiment shown in 
Table 6. Experiment 1 simulate the effects on the economic and social indicators of 
having no tax amnesty policy in Indonesia in 2016-2017. The only shock imposed in 
this experiment is 4% tax revenue growth. Figure 13 below shows the impact of the 
experiment on 12 indicators: 
  
Figure 13 - The Simulation Result of Experiment 1 
The result suggests that Experiment 1 has a slight contractionary effect on the economy 
as indicated by 0.1% decrease in GDP, consumption, and price index, as well as 0.1% 
increase in unemployment rate. Although income distribution between the poor and the 
rich improves, and the rural-urban income distribution worsens, overall, the 
distributional effects are insignificant. 
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Experiment 2 (Non-Targeted Tax Amnesty Policy) 
 Both Experiment 2.1 and 2.2 assess the effects of non-targeted tax amnesty policy 
on selected economic and social indicators. In terms of asset repatriation, Experiment 
2.1 assumes the shock as capital inflow (𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉 -38.79%), while Experiment 2.2 assumes 
that working capital loan (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 10), investment credit (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 11), consumer credit 
(𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 12), and government bond (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 7) are increased by 40%, 20%, 30%, and 10%, 
respectively. Regarding tax revenue collection from tax amnesty program, both 
experiments assume 15% increase, regardless the distribution. 
 
Figure 14 - The Simulation Result of Experiment 2.1 and 2.2 
 Figure 14 shows that tax amnesty followed up with increased demand in four 
financial instruments (Experiment 2.2) has a larger magnitude of impacts than tax 
amnesty with no specific allocation of repatriated assets (Experiment 2.1). Nevertheless, 
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both experiments suggest that non-targeted tax amnesty policy tend to have 
expansionary effects on the Indonesian economy as indicated by an increase in RGDP 
and consumption, as well as decreased unemployment rate, regardless of the 
magnitudes. On why the impact of the experiments have different magnitudes can be 
traced back to the non-simultaneous-simulation result for each shock as discussed 
earlier in the previous subsection (Figure 12 and its explanations). 
 For instance, regarding export and import, Experiment 2.1 contains 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #2𝐴 
that tend to decrease export (1%) and increase import (2%) as the capital inflows 
(through FSAV) have pushed the exchange rate to appreciate (3%). The experiment 
suggests that, in general, the level of economic activity in real sector has altered as 
indicated by falling unemployment rate and increased consumption, import, and RGDP. 
The altered level of economic activity, especially imports, that are mostly handled in 
urban area by urban poor, might explain the fall in income distribution between rural 
and urban dwellers (0.2%) and the improved equity level between the poor and the rich 
(0.3%). The decline in price index, however, has suggested that an increase in the supply 
of imported commodities is not accompanied by consumers’ willingness or ability to 
absorb commodities available in the market. 
 In contrast, Experiment 2.2 shows the opposite direction of export, import, and 
income distribution. Export is increased by 3% whereas import is fallen by 2% as a 
result of Rupiah depreciation. Income distribution between the poor and the rich 
worsens (-3%) while the equity between rural and urban dwellers improves (2%). These 
trajectories are typical of 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #2𝐵 and 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #2𝐸 in which financial market plays 
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its role in increasing the income of the rich, which in turn aggravate income inequality 
between high-income and low-income earners.  
 It is important to bear in mind that the increase in the working capital loan, 
investment credit, consumer credit, and government bond are in fact sourced from asset 
repatriation which is nothing but assets originated from abroad whose holders are mostly 
rich economic agents. In return of their participation in repatriating their foreign assets 
during tax amnesty period in 2016-2017, the rich were not only free from tax audit, 
investigation, and penalties which made them paying more taxes; instead they are also 
receiving financial income from their financial assets ownerships. Law No.11/2016 on 
Tax Amnesty deliberately expects this to happen, perhaps under consideration that 
capital inflows from asset repatriation would have been helping the economy to grow. 
However, our simulation shows that the cost of that expectation is nothing but worsened 
income inequality between the poor and the rich. This situation is typical of economic 
development policy in Indonesia in which income inequality is considered as a residual. 
 Regarding economic indicators, the growing economy as simulated in Experiment 
2.2 has pushed the price index to increase. However, this inflationary pressure is 
modestly offset by interest rate increase. Hence, along with 17% increase in 
consumption, 3% increase in export, and 2% decrease in import, overall, the economy 
is slightly expanding as indicated by 1% increase in RGDP. Labor market also benefited 
from this expansionary effect as the unemployment rate declined by 16%. Put together, 
by macroeconomic measures, non-targeted tax amnesty as simulated in these 
experiments is beneficial to the economy. One fundamental question to ask regarding 
social indicator, however, is whether inequality matters or not in policymaking. 
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Experiment 3 and 4 (Targeted Tax Amnesty Policy) 
 In this section, we discuss the impacts of tax amnesty policy that is specifically 
designed to target corporations (Experiment 3), as well as the rich and corporations 
(Experiment 4). Experiment 3.1 assumed that extra tax revenue from tax amnesty is 
shared proportionally to corporations (𝐹𝐼𝑁2, 𝐹𝐼𝑁3, and 𝐹𝐼𝑁4), whereas shock from 
asset repatriation is assumed come from capital inflow (𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉). Experiment 4.1 shared 
the extra tax revenue to corporations and the rich (𝐻𝐻2 and 𝐻𝐻4) while assuming the 
same shock as Experiment 3.1 in terms of asset repatriation. Figure 15 below compares 
the simulation results of Experiment 3.1 and 4.1: 
 
Figure 15 - The Simulation Result of Experiment 3.1 Compared to 4.1 
 As shown above, both experiments generate similar effects on all economic 
indicators and social indicators. Either targeting corporations (Exp 3.1) or targeting both 
the rich and corporations (Exp 4.1), tax amnesty generates contractionary effects on the 
economy. Capital inflows from asset repatriation have caused the Rupiah to appreciate 
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by 7% and 8% in Experiment 3.1 and 4.1, respectively. Consequently, import is 
increased, and export is declined by about 1.4%. The economy then faces deflationary 
pressure as the domestic consumption in both experiments shrinks by 2% and 3.5%, 
respectively. This pressure can be indicated by a modest decline in price index which is 
slightly offset by an increase in interest rate. Along with rising unemployment, overall, 
the economy has contracted.   
 The effect of targeting the rich and/or corporations on income inequality is 
obvious. In both experiments, taxing the rich improves the income distribution between 
high and low-income earners by about 1%. On the other hand, worsening rural-urban 
equity might suggest that rural dweller whose factor income is earned from their 
interaction with the rich and/or corporations—have lost parts of their income as the rich 
and corporations faced liquidity problem after paying large amount of taxes.   
 One interesting question that needs to be asked, however, is that of why targeting 
the rich and/or corporations have led the economy to shrink. The answer, perhaps, can 
be found in Akerlof and Shiller’s notion on animal spirits. The notion suggests that the 
causes of an up and down in the economy are largely beyond numbers, that is, mental 
in nature (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009). Targeting tax amnesty to those who play a big role 
and have a big share in the economy, namely the rich and the corporations, can dampen 
their sense of confidence and good faith that drive the economy. Being a target can also 
hurt their sense of fairness as if they were judged as tax evaders who seek forgiveness. 
This notion holds, especially when the information on who complies and who evades 
the tax law is, in fact, asymmetric. These mental state, in turn, repress their willingness 
to consume or invest which eventually leads the economy to shrink. 
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 Experiment 3.2 and 4.2 are a completely different story. These experiments 
suggest that those who participate in tax amnesty by repatriating their liquid foreign 
asset to be invested in four selected financial instruments—are given two incentives. 
First, they will be free from tax audit, penalties, and prosecution. Second, they will 
receive return on assets, in return for their investment in those four financial assets.   
 
Figure 16 - The Simulation Result of Experiment 3.2 Compared to 4.2 
 Figure 16 shows that giving the abovementioned incentives to those who invested 
their repatriated assets in four financial instruments, namely 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 7, 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 10,
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 11, and 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 12, has generated an expansionary effect on the economy. This 
effect can be indicated by positive percentage changes of RGDP (1%), consumption 
(15-16%), and net export (2%), along with falling unemployment rate (14%). Although 
the economy faces inflationary pressure, the increase in interest rate has served as a 
countermeasure for that pressure, therefore, altogether, the economy expands under 
those two scenarios.  
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 Considering income inequality indicator will lead to a different story. The 
expansion of the economy has led the rural-urban income distribution to improve by 
1.2-1.3%, which might suggest that both rural and urban dwellers are better-off with the 
expansionary effect on the economy. However, the expansion has been accompanied by 
worsening income distribution between high and low-income earners (-3%). This result 
suggests that two main features of Indonesia’s tax amnesty have played their role. These 
are incentives in the form of forgiveness from tax audit or prosecution which can cost 
the rich large amounts of tax payable, and most importantly, incentives in the form of 
financial income for the rich as a return for their willingness to invest their repatriated 
assets in four selected financial instruments. Put simply, financial income effects (along 
with tax forgiveness effect) are responsible for the worsening income inequality between 
the poor and the rich.  
 In summary, both targeted and non-targeted tax amnesty policy, especially those 
that are designed to incentivize the participants with financial income for their 
repatriated assets—has generated expansionary effects on the economy with the cost of 
worsening income inequality between the poor and the rich. Among those two scenarios, 
the non-targeted policy is more superior in terms of job creation, and of consumption 
and export spurring, as well as of rural-urban income distribution improvement. By 
contrast, the rich/corporation-targeting policy that has no salient information on where 
the repatriated assets are allocated in the financial market has led the economy to shrink.   
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Seven scenarios are simulated with FCGE model to assess the effects of having 
tax amnesties that are designed to target the rich and/or the corporations (namely 
‘targeted tax amnesty’) as well as tax amnesties that are inclusive to any participants 
(‘non-targeted tax amnesty’). Another important feature of the scenarios is the type of 
shocks with regard to assets repatriation. These are capital inflows (through 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉) with 
(1) no specific and salient asset allocation to financial instruments available in the 
financial market, and with (2) specific allocation of repatriated assets owned by the rich 
into four selected financial instruments.   
 The simulations have revealed that Indonesia’s third tax amnesty has generated a 
slight expansionary effect on the economy at the cost of worsening income inequality. 
As measured with nine economic and three social indicators, the simulation results show 
that although ‘targeted’ and ‘non-targeted’ tax amnesty generally lead the economy to 
grow, income inequality between the poor and the rich is widened. The financial income 
effects along with tax forgiveness effect are responsible for the worsening income 
inequality between the poor and the rich.  
 Financial institutions, especially commercial banks mostly capture an increase in 
domestic liquidity caused by capital inflows from asset repatriation whose holders are 
mostly the rich. As a result, the liability side of banks’ balance sheets increases so that 
banks have more financial resources to be allocated to the economic agents. For the 
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profit-maximizing purpose, banks allocate that resources to four financial instruments 
in the form of loans and government bonds. In return, they must transfer financial 
income to the asset holders (i.e. the rich). Beside receiving additional income from their 
ownership of financial instrument in banks, the rich are legally forgiven from being 
subjected to tax audit or investigation which may cause them to pay large amounts of 
taxes. Although an increase in tax revenue collection has a negative effect on the income 
of the rich, those financial income effect combined with forgiveness effect largely offset 
that negative effect of tax revenue collection. If an increase in the rich's financial income 
is accompanied with inflationary pressure, the rich might be hit by the pressure but their 
regular consumption could still be sustained, whereas the poor will be the hardest hit 
since most of their incomes are spent for basic consumption. Hence, price effect can 
amplify the worsened income inequality between the poor and the rich in the Indonesia.  
 Other obvious findings emerged from this experimental study is that the saliency 
in the allocation of the repatriated asset to financial instruments matters. Out of seven 
simulations, one shows that tax amnesty that is designed to target the rich and the 
corporations specifically but with no salient information on where the repatriated assets 
have been invested in the financial market—tend to have contractionary effects on the 
economy. Moreover, the scenario will also worsen the income distribution between rural 
and urban area. Compared to other scenarios, ‘non-targeted policy’ is more superior in 
terms of job creation, consumption boosting and export spurring, and of rural-urban 
income distribution improvement.  
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 While comprehensively covering the wide impacts of tax amnesty on the 
economic and social indicators, this study was limited by the absence of FSAM dataset 
that can capture economic development post-tax reform in 2009 and post-transfer of 
property tax management from central government to local government in 2014. 
Another limitation is the absence of dynamic model that can be used for long-run 
assessment for the repatriated assets. In addition, the model assumed that institutional 
problem in Indonesia is at its minimum level. No specific BOCR (Benefit, Opportunity, 
Cost, and Risk) calculations have been made to provide judgements on the best 
counterfactual scenarios that work for Indonesia.        
 It is noteworthy also to consider the political cost of introducing tax amnesty, 
including the future cost of having law-abiding taxpayers (voters) that feel disappointed 
for being treated unfairly as policymakers offer generosity and forgiveness to tax 
evaders and delinquent taxpayers. In the future, this unrest can possibly lead to a new 
pattern and larger magnitudes of non-compliance. This political cost is often overlooked 
by policy actors because of its latency and intangibility. The other reason is that either 
politician whose time horizon is too narrow (i.e., next election) and civil servants whose 
time horizon is way longer than politicians (i.e., pension) put too high discount factor 
to future tax revenue collection and tax compliance. 
 At the same time, the tendency of incrementalism among government agencies 
has been giving little if not zero incentive to civil servants to develop a technique that 
can comprehensively assess the latency of that political costs of tax amnesties. The 
intangibility of that costs, perhaps, also hinders policy actors from conducting 
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assessment. Therefore, a methodology that can tackle that latency and intangibility issue 
needs to be promoted (e.g., Analytic Hierarchy Process or Analytic Network Process). 
The functionality of this methodology can help Indonesia to depart from old political 
economy that tends to neglect the behavioral effect of other players in the society. The 
arrival to new political economy, according to de Janvry et.al, only possible if there are 
rooms available for both government’s technocratic advice and external players’ 
intervention in the policy-making process. When that room is available, the 
abovementioned methodology will properly function in giving new information about 
the expected outcome of the policy game (de Janvry, Sadoulet, & Thorbecke, 1995). 
 Finally, there are certainly limitations that are unknown or unimaginable. 
However, I do believe that the experiments conducted in this thesis are a valuable 
contribution to the previous literature on the impacts of tax amnesty. In conclusion, tax 
amnesty might cause the economy to expand or to contract, depends on how it is 
designed. However, no matter the economic effects of tax amnesty, social indicators 
such as income inequality should not be treated as a residual.   
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APPENDIX 1 
This study closely follows the Financial Computable General Equilibrium (FCGE) model 
developed by Azis (2002). Most of the equations, variables, and notations listed below are, 
therefore, similar to the original model, except for equations that reflect extra income taxes 
collection19 and allocation of assets repatriation20 to four selected financial instruments. 
Equation with asterisk (*) shows the major distinction and a departure from the original non-
tax amnesty FCGE model. 
1. BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS 
1.1. Production Block (18 equations) 
 Equation (1) - Factor demand function (𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑓) 
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑓 = 𝑉𝐴𝑖 (
𝑃𝑉𝑖 𝑏𝑣𝑖,𝑓
𝑊𝐹𝑓 𝑤𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑓 (𝑎𝑣𝑥𝑖 𝑎𝑣𝑖)𝜌𝑣𝑖
)
1
(1+𝜌𝑣𝑖)
 
Equation (2) - Value added definition (𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖) 
𝑉𝐴𝑖 = 𝑎𝑣𝑥𝑖 𝑎𝑣𝑖 (∑ 𝑏𝑣𝑖,𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑓
−𝜌𝑣𝑖
𝑓
)
−1
𝜌𝑣𝑖
 
                                                 
19 In the income block, “Equation (19)” on Direct Taxes (DTAXEQgin,din) contains a tax factor parameter 
(𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛) that is intended to modify the original direct tax equation so that it enables the model to 
capture an increase in tax revenue collected from tax amnesty (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 #1 as shown earlier in Table 4 - 
Subchapter 4.2) whether it is from ‘non-targeted’ tax amnesty scenario (15% increase), ‘targeted’ tax 
amnesty scenario (either 17% increase for corporations and rich households in rural and urban area or 
20% increase for corporations), as well as from having no tax amnesty policy (4% growth of tax revenue 
collection). Put simply, the new parameter (𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡) allows modeler to modify the size of transfers 
originated from domestic institutions (𝑑𝑖𝑛) to government (𝑔𝑖𝑛) in the form of direct tax.  
20 Financial module (specifically the C & D block) is modified to introduce the allocation of repatriated 
assets from tax amnesty to four financial instruments, either in the form of loans, namely working capital 
loans (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 10), investment credits (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 11), consumer credits (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 12), or in the form of securities 
i.e. government bond (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴 7). Parameter 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡1 allows us to modify the size of financial 
liability stocks of institutions (𝑖𝑛) in the form of credit (𝑎𝑠𝑡1). Whereas, parameter 𝑔𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒  
modifies the size of financial liability stocks in FSAM dataset of government (g𝑖𝑛) in the form of 
government bonds (𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒). 
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Equation (3) - Intermediate goods (VA equation 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 = 𝑉𝐴𝑖 (
𝑃𝑉𝑖 (1 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖)
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 𝑏𝑖𝑖
)
1
(1+𝜌𝑖𝑖)
 
Equation (4) - Sectoral output function (𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑖) 
𝑋𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑏𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝐴𝑖
−𝜌𝑖𝑖 +  (1 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖) 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖
−𝜌𝑖𝑖)
−1
𝜌𝑖𝑖 
Equation (5) - CET function (𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑖) 
𝑋𝑖 = 𝑎𝑥𝑖(𝑏𝑥𝑖 𝐷𝑖
−𝜌𝑥𝑖 +  (1 − 𝑏𝑥𝑖) 𝐸𝑖
𝜌𝑥𝑖)
1
𝜌𝑥𝑖 
Equation (6) - Armington function (𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑇𝑂𝑁𝑖) 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑎𝑞𝑖(𝑏𝑞𝑖 𝐷𝑖
−𝜌𝑞𝑖 + (1 − 𝑏𝑞𝑖) 𝑀𝑖
−𝜌𝑞𝑖)
−1
𝜌𝑞𝑖 
Wages equation (𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖 =  𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝑣𝑝𝑖 (
𝑃𝑉𝑖
𝑃𝑉0𝑖
)
1−𝑣𝑝𝑖
(
(
𝑋𝑖
∑ 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑓𝑙𝑓𝑙
)
𝑃𝐷𝐿0𝑖
)
𝜋𝑖
 
 (𝑊𝐹𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑓𝑖) 
𝑊𝐹𝑓𝑙 =  𝑊𝐹0𝑓𝑙  ∑ 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖. 𝑤𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑓𝑙
𝑖
 
Intermediate composite equation (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑖) 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖  =  𝑎𝑡𝑖(𝑏𝑡𝑖𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖
−𝜌𝑡𝑖  + (1 − 𝑏𝑡𝑖) 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖
−𝜌𝑡𝑖)
−1
𝜌𝑡𝑖 
Intermediate composite equation 2 (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀2𝑖) 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 = 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 
Intermediate composite optimality (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 = 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 ((
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖
𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖
) (
1 − 𝑏𝑡𝑖
𝑏𝑡𝑖
))
1
(1+𝜌𝑡𝑖)
 
Armington for non-import (𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑇𝑂𝑁2𝑖)  
𝑄𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 
Cost minimization (𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑖) 
𝑀𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 ((
𝑃𝐷𝑖
𝑃𝑀𝑖
) (
1 − 𝑏𝑞𝑖
𝑏𝑞𝑖
))
1
(1+𝜌𝑞𝑖)
 
CET for non-export equation (𝐶𝐸𝑇2𝑖) 
𝑋𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 
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Revenue maximization (𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖) 
𝐸𝑖 =  𝐷𝑖 ((
𝑃𝐸𝑖
𝑃𝐷𝑖(1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝑖 − 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑓𝑖)
) (
𝑏𝑥𝑖
1 − 𝑏𝑥𝑖
))
1
(1−𝜌𝑥𝑖)
 
Supply of intermediate inputs equation (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄𝑖 =  ∑ (𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖  +  𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖)
𝑗
 
Total TTM equation (𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖 = 𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖 + 𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖 
Total TTMX equation (𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑋𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑋𝑖 =  𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑖  ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑗
𝑗
 
1.2. Price Block (11 equations) 
Equation (7) - Domestic price of exported commodities (𝑃𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖) 
𝑃𝐸𝑖 = 𝑃𝑊𝐸𝑖  
𝐸𝑋𝑅
(1 + 𝑡𝑒𝑖 − 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑖)
 
Equation (8) - Domestic price of imported commodities (𝑃𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖) 
𝑃𝑀𝑖 = 𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑖 𝐸𝑋𝑅 (1 + 𝑡𝑚𝑖 − 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑖) 
Equation (9) - Absorption (the value of Armington Composite Goods) 
𝑄𝑖 𝑃𝑄𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 𝑃𝐷𝑖 + 𝑀𝑖 𝑃𝑀𝑖  
Equation (10) - The value of domestic output (𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖) 
𝑋𝑖 𝑃𝑋𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 𝑃𝐷𝑖(1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 − 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑓𝑖) + 𝐸𝑖  𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖  
Equation (11) - The price of sectoral capital goods (𝑃𝐾𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖) 
𝑃𝐾𝑖 = ∑  𝑃𝑄𝑗  [𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑖]
𝑗
  
Equation (12) - The price of value added (𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑖) 
𝑃𝑉𝑖 =
(𝑋𝑖 𝑃𝑋𝑖 − 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖) 
𝑉𝐴𝑖
 
Equation (13) - The price of domestically produced intermediate inputs (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖) 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑖 𝑃𝑄𝑗
𝑗
  
Equation (14) - The price of imported intermediate inputs (𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖) 
𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑗,𝑖 𝑃𝑄𝑗
𝑗
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Price of Intermediate Composite (𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖) 
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖  =
((𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖) + (𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖)) 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖
 
Weight on prices equation (𝑊𝑇𝑄𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝑤𝑡𝑞𝑖 =  
𝑄𝑖
∑ 𝑄𝑗𝑗
  
Price Index (𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐷𝐸𝐹) 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =  
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃
  
1.3. Income Block (5 equations) 
Equation (15) - Factor income (𝑌𝐹𝐸𝑄𝑓) 
𝑌𝐹𝑓 = ∑ (𝑊𝐹𝑓  𝑤𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑓)
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝑌𝐹𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑓,𝑓𝑟
𝑓𝑟
  
Equation (16) - Government income (𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑔𝑖𝑛) 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛 = ∑ (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑓 𝑌𝐹𝑓)
𝑓
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2
𝑖𝑛2
+ (𝑔𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ∑ (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 + 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖)
𝑖
)  
Equation (17) - Non-government domestic income (𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖) 
𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑖 = ∑ (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑓 𝑌𝐹𝑓)
𝑓
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑖𝑛2
𝑖𝑛2
  
Equation (18) - Foreign income (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑓𝑟) 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑓𝑟 = ∑ (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟,𝑓 𝑌𝐹𝑓)
𝑓
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑓𝑟,𝑖𝑛2
𝑖𝑛2
+ (𝑚𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑟 ∑ (𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑖 𝐸𝑋𝑅 𝑀𝑖)
𝑖
)  
*Equation (19) - Direct taxes (𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐸𝑄𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛) 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛 = 𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑛 𝒕𝒂𝒙𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒈𝒊𝒏,𝒅𝒊𝒏  
A new parameter for extra tax revenue collection from tax amnesty are introduced in 
the GAMS IDE codes: 
 
The following figures show the GAMS codes for the shocks that come from the 
collection of extra tax revenues from tax amnesty program: 
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1.4. Expenditure Block (15 equations) 
Equation (20) - Household expenditure (𝐻𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑄ℎ) 
  𝐸𝑋𝑃ℎ = 𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ + ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,ℎ𝑔𝑖𝑛 + ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑛𝑔𝑖,ℎ𝑛𝑔𝑖 + ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑓𝑟,ℎ𝑓𝑟  
Equation (21) - Household consumption behavior (𝑌𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑄ℎ) 
𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ = (𝐼𝑁𝐶ℎ − ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,ℎ
𝑔𝑖𝑛
) (1 − 𝑚𝑝𝑠ℎ)
− (∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑛𝑔𝑖,ℎ
𝑛𝑔𝑖
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑓𝑟,ℎ
𝑓𝑟
) 
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Equation (22) - Government expenditure (𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑔𝑖𝑛) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑛 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 (∑ (𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑄𝑖)
𝑖
+ ∑ (𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖 + 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐸𝑖 + 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀𝑖)
𝑖
)
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛
 
Equation (23) - Non-government expenditure (𝑂𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑛𝑛𝑜) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑜 = ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑛𝑛𝑜
𝑖𝑛
 
Equation (24) - Foreign expenditure (𝑅𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑓𝑟) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑓𝑟 = 𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑟 ∑ (𝑃𝑊𝐸𝑖  𝐸𝑋𝑅 𝐸𝑖)
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝑌𝐹𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑓,𝑓𝑟
𝑓
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑓𝑟
𝑖𝑛
 
Equation (25) - Private domestic investment (𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 𝑉𝐴𝑖
𝜆1𝑖𝜆0𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛(1 + 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁)
𝜆2𝑖  𝐸𝑋𝑅𝜆3𝑖 
Average Interest Rate (𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑄) 
𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 =
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑁𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠
∑ ∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠
 
Equation (26) - Investment by origin (𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝐼𝐷𝑖 = ∑ 𝐷𝐾𝑗[𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑗]
𝑗
 
Equation (27) - Investment by destination (𝐷𝐾𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑃𝐾𝑖 = 𝑘𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇) 
Investment Equation (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑄) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 = ∑ ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛𝑖
 
Domestic savings (𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑄𝑑𝑖𝑛) 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑑𝑖𝑛 = 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑛 − 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑛 
Foreign savings (𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐹𝑄𝑓𝑟) 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑓𝑟 = 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑓𝑟 − 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑓𝑟 
Savings equation (𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑄) 
𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛
 
ROW saving equation (𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑆𝐴𝑉) 
𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉. 𝐸𝑋𝑅 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑓𝑟
𝑓𝑟
 
Consumption demand (𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
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𝐶𝐷𝑖 =
∑ 𝛼𝑞𝑖,ℎℎ 𝑌𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆ℎ
𝑃𝑄𝑖
 
1.5. Market Clearing Block (3 equations) 
Equation (28) - Equilibrium in goods market (𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐿𝑖) 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄𝑖 + 𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝐺𝐷𝑖 + 𝐼𝐷𝑖 +
𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑋𝑖
𝑃𝑄𝑖
 
Equation (29) - Equilibrium in capital market (𝐹𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐸𝑄𝑓) 
𝐹𝑆𝑓 = ∑ 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑓
𝑖
 
Equation (30) - Equilibrium in labor market (𝐹𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐸𝑄) 
𝐿𝑆 = (1 + 𝑈𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅) ∑ 𝐹𝑆𝑓𝑙
𝑓𝑙
 
1.6. GDP Block (2 equations) 
Equation (31) - GDP based on VA (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑌) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = ∑ (𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑃𝑉𝑖 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 + 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖 − 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖 − 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀𝑖)
𝑖
 
Equation (32) - Real GDP (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅) 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 = ∑ (𝐶𝑑𝑖 + 𝐺𝑑𝑖 + 𝐼𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝐸𝑖
𝑖
− ∑ 𝑀𝑖(1 − 𝑇𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙0𝑖)
𝑖
)
𝑖
 
1.7. Distortion Block (7 equations) 
TTM domestic (𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝑖 𝑃𝐷𝑖 𝐷𝑖 
TTM import (𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖 = 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑖 𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑖 𝐸𝑋𝑅. 𝑀𝑖 
Indirect tax (𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 = 𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖 𝑃𝐷𝑖 𝐷𝑖 
Tariffs (𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖 = 𝑡𝑚𝑖 𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑖 𝐸𝑋𝑅. 𝑀𝑖 
Imperfect substitution (𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑄𝑖) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 = 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑓𝑖 𝑃𝐷𝑖 𝐷𝑖 
Export subsidy (𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐸𝑄𝑖) 
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑖 𝑃𝐸𝑖  𝐸𝑖 
Import subsidy (𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀𝑄𝑖) 
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𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀𝑖 = 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖 𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑖 𝐸𝑋𝑅. 𝑀𝑖 
1.8. Transfer Block (4 equations) 
Equation (33) - Total institutional transfers (𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2) 
𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 = 𝐺𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 + 𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 + 𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 
Domestic institutions’ transfer to government (𝐺𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛) 
𝐺𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛 = 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛 
Return of financial assets transferred to household (𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐸𝑄ℎ,𝑖𝑛2) 
𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁ℎ,𝑖𝑛2 = 𝑅𝑁𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ  ∑ (𝑅𝑁𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛2,𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛)
𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛
 
Share for financial returns transfer (𝑅𝑁𝑆ℎ𝑟𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑛) 
𝑅𝑁𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛 =
∑ (𝑅𝑁𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛,𝑖𝑛)𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛
∑ ∑ (𝑅𝑁𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛,𝑖𝑛2)𝑖𝑛2𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑛
 
1.9. Financial Block (7 equations) 
Equation (34) - Total savings and investments 
𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 + ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠
𝑎𝑠
 
𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 = 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑛 + ∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛
𝑎𝑠
 
Equation (35) - Institution's asset balance (𝐴𝑠𝐼𝑁𝐵𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑛) 
𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 
Equation (36) - Asset at the end of period (current balance) (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑄𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛) 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛 = 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛 
liability at the end of period (𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠)  
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠 = 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠 + 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠 
Fixed investment flow (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑄𝑖𝑛) 
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑖𝑛 = ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑖𝑛
𝑖
 
Fixed investment stock-flow (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑛) 
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑖𝑛 + 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛 
Wealth flow (𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐹𝑄𝑖𝑛) 
𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑛 = 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑛 
Wealth stock-flow (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑄𝑖𝑛) 
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𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 = 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑛 + 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛 
1.10. C & D Block (16 equations) 
Equation (37) - Allocation behavior (𝐴𝑆𝑇1𝐴𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑡1,𝑖𝑛) 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠𝑡1,𝑖𝑛 = 𝜃1𝑎𝑠𝑡1,𝑖𝑛  (
𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑡1
𝑟𝑛0𝑎𝑠𝑡1
)
𝜎1𝑎𝑠𝑡,𝑖𝑛
 
*Allocation behavior (𝐴𝑆𝑇1𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡1)  
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡1𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒏,𝒂𝒔𝒕𝟏 = 𝑎𝑠𝑡1𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡1 (∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠𝑡1,𝑖𝑛2
𝑖𝑛2
) 
Two new parameters for asset repatriation are introduced in the GAMS IDE codes: 
 
The following figure shows the GAMS codes for the shock that come from the 
allocation of repatriated asset to financial instruments in the form of loans: 
 
Allocation behavior (𝐴𝑆𝑇2𝐴𝑄𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡2) 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡2 = 𝜃2𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡2  (
𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑡2
𝑟𝑛0𝑎𝑠𝑡2
)
𝜎2𝑎𝑠𝑡2,𝑖𝑛
 
Allocation behavior (𝐴𝑆𝑇2𝑆𝐻𝑎𝑠𝑡2,𝑖𝑛) 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠𝑡2,𝑖𝑛 = 𝑎𝑠𝑡2𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡2,𝑖𝑛 (∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛2,𝑎𝑠𝑡2
𝑖𝑛2
) 
*Allocation behavior (𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒) 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐺𝑂𝑉1,𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝒈𝒃𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝑮𝑶𝑽𝟏,𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒆 = 𝜃2𝐺𝑂𝑉1,𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒 (
𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒
𝑟𝑛0𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒
)
𝜎2𝐺𝑂𝑉1,𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒
 
The following figure shows the GAMS codes for the shock that come from the 
allocation of repatriated asset to financial instruments in the form of loans and 
government bond: 
  
80 
 
 
Allocation behavior (𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑄𝐸𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑞) 
∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑞
𝑖𝑛
= ∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑞,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛
 
Composite interest rate (𝑅𝑁𝐴𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑛) 
𝑅𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑛 =
(∑ 𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑝𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑝,𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑝 )
(∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑝,𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑝 )
 
𝑅𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑛 =
(∑ 𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑔𝑏𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑔𝑏,𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑔𝑏 )
(∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑔𝑏,𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑔𝑏 )
 
𝑅𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑛 =
(∑ 𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑐𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑐 )
(∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑐,𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑐 )
 
𝑅𝑁𝐴4𝑖𝑛 =
(∑ 𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑟𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑟,𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑟 )
(∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑟,𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑟 )
 
𝑅𝑁𝐴5𝑖𝑛 =
(∑ 𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑞𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑞,𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑞 )
(∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑞,𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑞 )
 
FOREX reserves (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴1𝐸𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑓𝑥𝑟) 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠𝑓𝑥𝑟,𝐹𝐼𝑁1 = 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊1,𝐴𝑠𝑓𝑥𝑟 
Money demand (𝑀𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑛) 
𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑛 = 𝛼1𝑖𝑛 (𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑛
𝛼2𝑖𝑛)(𝑟𝑛𝑣1𝑖𝑛
−𝛼3𝑖𝑛) 
Composite interest rate except money (𝑅𝑁𝑉1𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑛)  
𝑟𝑛𝑣1𝑖𝑛 =
(∑ 𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑,𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑 )
(∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑,𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑 )
 
Money demand portfolio (𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑,𝑖𝑛) 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑,𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑,𝑖𝑛𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑛 
Money demand portfolio (𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑) 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑 = 𝑚𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑 (∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑑,𝑖𝑛2
𝑖𝑛2
) 
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2. LIST OF VARIABLES 
2.1. Core Computable General Equilibrium Variables 
𝑋𝑖   Initial Domestic Output 
𝑉𝐴𝑖  Initial Value-Added 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖  Initial Intermediate Composite 
𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖  Initial Domestic Intermediate Input 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖  Initial Imported Intermediate Input 
𝑄𝑖   Initial Composite Good Quantity 
𝐷𝑖   Initial Domestic Good Sold Domestically 
𝑀𝑖   Initial Import Quantity 
𝐸𝑖   Initial Export Quantity 
 
𝑃𝑋𝑖   Initial Price of X 
𝑃𝑉𝑖   Initial Price of Value-Added 
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖  Initial Price of Intermediate Composite 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖  Initial Price of Domestic Intermediate Input 
𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑖  Initial Price of Foreign Intermediate Input 
𝑃𝑄𝑖  Initial Price of Composite Goods Q 
𝑃𝐷𝑖  Initial Price of Domestic Good Sold Domestically 
𝑃𝑀𝑖   Initial Price of Import Quantity 
𝑃𝐸𝑖   Initial Price of Export Quantity 
𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑖   Initial World Price of Imports 
𝑃𝑊𝐸𝑖  Initial World Price of Exports 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  Initial Price Index 
  
𝐸𝑋𝑅  Initial Exchange Rate 
𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖  Initial Trade & Transport Margin (Paid) 
𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖  Initial Trade & Transport Margin on Domestic (Paid) 
𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑖  Initial Trade & Transport Margin on Import (Paid) 
𝑇𝑡𝑚𝑋𝑖  Initial Trade & Transport Margin (Received) 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝑖  Domestic Trade and Transport Margins 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄𝑖  Initial Supply of Intermediate Goods or Services 
𝐶𝐷𝑖   Initial Private Consumption Demand 
𝐺𝐷𝑖          Initial Govt Consumption Demand 
𝐼𝐷𝑖   Initial Investment Demand 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃  Initial GDP 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃  Initial Real GDP 
 
𝑤𝑡𝑞𝑖  Weight for Consumer Price Index 
𝑇𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝑖  Transport & Trade Margin Real Terms Initial Value 
 
𝑌𝐹𝑓   Initial Factor Income 
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑓  Initial Factor Demand 
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𝑊𝐹𝑓  Initial Factor Price 
𝑊𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑓  Initial Factor Price Sectoral Proportion Ratios 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖  Initial Sectoral Wage 
𝑃𝐷𝐿𝑖  Initial Sectoral Average Productivity 
𝐹𝑆𝑓   Initial Factor Supply 
𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑃  Labor Supply (Total) 
𝑈𝐸𝑀𝑃  Unemployment (Total) 
𝑈𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑅  Unemployment Rate 
𝑌𝐹𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑓,𝑓𝑟  Domestic's Earning Abroad (ROW-to-Factors) in Foreign Currency 
 
𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 Initial Institutional Transfers (Total) 
𝐺𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 Initial Institutional Transfers (to Government or Direct Tax) 
𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 Initial Institutional Transfers (Financial Returns) 
𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛2 Initial Institutional Transfers (Others) 
 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑛  Institution's Revenue 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑛  Institution's Expenditure 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑛  Institution's Saving 
𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉  Initial ROW Saving in Foreign Currency 
 
𝑌𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ  Initial Consumption by Households 
𝑀𝑃𝑆ℎ  Initial Households’ Marginal Propensity to Save 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖  Initial Total Indirect Tax 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖  Initial Tariff 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 Initial Imperfect Competition Distortion 
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑖  Initial Sectoral Subsidy 
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐸𝑖  Export Subsidy 
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀𝑖  Import Subsidy 
𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑑𝑖𝑛 Initial Direct-Income Tax 
 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺  Initial Total Saving 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇  Initial Total Investment 
𝑃𝐾𝑖  Initial Price of Capital by Sector of Destination 
𝐷𝐾𝑖  Initial Quantity of Capital by Sector of Destination 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑖𝑛  Private Domestic Investment 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑄  Total Export Quantity 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑀𝑄  Total Import Quantity 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝐵𝐴𝐿 Total Trade Balance (𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑄 –  𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑀𝑄) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝐵𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖 Trade Balance (𝐸𝑖 − 𝑀𝑖) 
𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑈  Income Distribution between Rural and Urban Dwellers 
𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐿𝐻  Income Distribution between the Poor and the Rich 
 
2.2. Financial Module’s Variables 
𝑇𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑛  Total Asset Stock Value 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛  Asset Stock Value (end-of-period) 
𝐴𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛 Share of Asset Stock Value 
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑛  Fixed Asset Stock Value (end-of-period) 
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𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛  Total Liability Stock Value 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠  Liability Stock Value (end-of-period) 
𝐿𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠  Share of Liability Stock Value 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛 Asset Stock Value (beginning-of-period) 
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛 Fixed Asset Stock Value (beginning-of-period) 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠 Liability Stock Value (beginning-of-period) 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛  Wealth Stock Value (end-of-period) 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛 Lag of Wealth Stock Value 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑠,𝑖𝑛  Asset (Flow) Value 
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑖𝑛  Fixed Asset (Fixed Investment) 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑛,𝑎𝑠  Liability (Flow) value 
𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑛  Flow of Wealth 
 
𝑃𝑆𝑎𝑠  Price of Asset 
𝑃𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔  Price of Asset in the Last Period 
𝑅𝑁   Asset's Rate of Return 
𝑅𝑁𝐿𝑎𝑔  Lag of Asset’s Rate of Return 
 
𝑅𝑁𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛  Share of Assets in Institution 
𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁  Average Interest Rate 
 
𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑛  Money Demand 
𝑟𝑛𝑣1𝑖𝑛  Average Interest Rate #1 (Non-Money) 
𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡  Total Money Demand 
𝑟𝑚   Total Asset and Liability 
𝑚2𝑠  Money Supply 
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑎𝑠  Total Liability Stock 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑠 Total Asset Stock 
 
𝑅𝑁𝐴1𝑖𝑛  Composite Interest Rate 1 
𝑅𝑁𝐴2𝑖𝑛  Composite Interest Rate 2 
𝑅𝑁𝐴3𝑖𝑛  Composite Interest Rate 3 
𝑅𝑁𝐴4𝑖𝑛  Composite Interest Rate 4 
𝑅𝑁𝐴5𝑖𝑛  Composite Interest Rate 5 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Figure 17 - Interlocked System of FCGE Variables Source: Azis (2014) 
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